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STATE DISCLOSURE REGULATION AND THE ALLOCATION
OF REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES
MARK A. SARGENT*
State regulation of securities disclosure is a misunderstood and
underappreciated phenomenon. Little discussion of the topic can
be found in the academic literature,' and the current debate over
state securities regulation has focused almost entirely on the state
securities administrators' authority to review the substantive merits
of registered offerings.2 By these measures, state disclosure regula-
tion appears to be neither important nor controversial. A closer
look at the way state securities regulation really works, however, will
show that state regulation of securities disclosure is in fact very im-
portant. This article provides that closer look at the realities of state
disclosure regulation. Before beginning, however, it makes sense to
ask why this regulatory technique is so poorly understood.
Two sources of confusion have impeded development of a
fuller understanding of state disclosure regulation. The first source
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1. There is, for example, virtually no discussion of the topic in the major treatises
on state securities regulation, or "blue sky" law. SeeJ. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW (1985); H.
MARSH, JR. & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAW (1986); C.
Moscow & H. MAKENS, MICHIGAN SECURITIES REGULATION (1983); H. SOWARDS & N.
HIRSCH, BLUE SKY REGULATION (3 vols. 1982). There is also little discussion of the topic
in one of the better-known practitioner's guides, P. FASS & D. WITrNER, BLUE SKY PRAC-
TICE FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIMITED OFFERINGS (1986).
2. For citations to some of the literature of this debate, see Ad Hoc Subcommittee
on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities Committee, Report on State
Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAw 785, 785 nn. l&2 (1986) [hereinafter
Report on State Merit Regulation]. See also Jennings, Childers & Kudla, Federalism to an Ad-
vantage: The Demise of State Blue Shy Laws Under the Uniform Securities Act, 19 AKRON L. REV.
395 (1986); Sargent, The Challenge to Merit Regulation (pts. 1 & 2), 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 276
(1984), 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 367 (1985) [hereinafter Sargent, Challenge]; Walker & Hadaway,
Merit Standards Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J.
CORP. L. 651 (1982); Comment, What to Do with Merit Review, 65 NEB. L. REV. 413 (1986)
[hereinafter Comment, What to Do]; Comment, Compromise Merit Review-A Proposal for
Both Sides of the Debate, 60 WASH. L. REV. 141 (1984). For discussion of the definition of
merit regulation, see infra text accompanying notes 61-63, and Report on State Merit Regu-
lation, supra, at 795, 823-30.
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is an excessively abstract, absolutist distinction between merit and
disclosure regulation. The conventional wisdom tends to define the
two regulatory techniques as fundamentally antithetical, with merit
regulation the states' exclusive preserve and disclosure regulation
the province of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).3
One of the goals of this article is to show that, in state law, disclo-
sure and merit regulation are not clearly antithetical, but rather
function together in a complex and symbiotic interrelationship.
The second source of confusion is the relative inaccessibility of
information about how state disclosure regulation works. One can-
not explain, let alone evaluate, state disclosure regulation by exam-
ining statutes, rules and regulations, statements of policy, or case
law. There are no state equivalents to the SEC's massive compen-
dium of rules and regulations governing disclosure.4 This law is be-
ing made in the oral and written comments provided by state
administrators on registration statements filed in their jurisdictions,
in the negotiations between the administrators and the attorneys re-
sponsible for those registration statements,5 and in the prospectuses
reflecting the outcomes of those negotiations. Accurate information
about state disclosure regulation thus cannot be obtained through a
trip to the law library, no matter how diligent the researcher. This
difficulty has impeded the development of a clear picture of this
phenomenon. The difficulty may be overcome, however, by turning
to those persons actually involved in the blue sky process. The de-
scription of state disclosure regulation contained in this article is
3. See, e.g., Empirical Research Project, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New
Importance for an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689, 706 (1982) (drawing unqualified
antithesis between state merit regulation and federal disclosure regulation) [hereinafter
ERP]; Comment, What to Do, supra note 2, at 414-15 (similarly relying on overstated
distinction between disclosure and merit regulation); Dumont, The Case for States to Abol-
ish 'Merit Review' of New Offerings, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 20, 1985, at 4, col. 3 (emphasizing in
absolute terms philosophical differences between federal and state regulation).
4. There are, of course, published requirements for the contents of registration
statements. See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. ACT § 304(b), 7A U.L.A. 608-12 (1978) (describing con-
tents of registration statement filed with application for registration by qualification).
These can be quite detailed. See, e.g., North American Securities Administrators Associa-
tion, Statement of Policy on Registration of Oil and Gas Program § X, NASAA Reports
(CCH) 2610 (Sept. 22, 1976) (outlining prospectus and disclosure requirements). The
SEC's disclosure rules under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982),
however, are far more detailed. See Regulation C, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.400-.494 (1986);
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10-.802 (1986).
5. For discussion of the role of these negotiations in the state registration process,
see Bartell, Blue Sky Registration, in 2 SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES §§ 24.01, 24.03, 24.04
(A. Sommer, Jr. ed. 1987); Gray, Blue Sky Practice-A Morass?, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1519,
1525-31 (1969); Ptacek, Blue Sky Considerations in Structuring a Public Offering, 21 DRAKE L.
REV. 225, 235-36 (1972); Report on State Merit Regulation, supra note 2, at 801-02.
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derived in large part from interviews with state administrators and
blue sky practitioners intimately familiar with these problems.6 It
also may be overcome by turning to the tangible results of the state
disclosure review process-the prospectuses drafted or redrafted to
reflect the states' disclosure requirements.7 Taken together, these
sources permit a detailed description of the different varieties of
state disclosure regulation.
Part I sets the stage for this description by providing a brief
overview of the joint state-federal regulatory system. Part II focuses
directly on the theoretical distinction between merit and disclosure
regulation and suggests some substantial qualifications. Part III ex-
amines with specificity the different varieties of state disclosure reg-
ulation, with particular emphasis on examples of the functional
interdependence of merit and disclosure review. Finally, Part IV
critically evaluates the role of state disclosure regulation in the allo-
cation of regulatory responsibilities between the states and the SEC.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATORY CONTEXT
An analysis of disclosure regulation underfederal securities law
would require consideration of a bewildering array of requirements
under the Securities Exchange Act of 19348 (the 1934 Act) with re-
spect to periodic reporting,9 proxy solicitations, 10 tender offers,'
6. Note, however, that the description of state disclosure review practices contained
in this article, infra text accompanying notes 96-134, does not purport to be based on
scientific surveying and sampling techniques. These practices also will not be "sup-
ported" by whatever "authority" might be contained in footnote references to tele-
phone conversations or correspondence with state securities administrators and blue sky
practitioners, most of whom are understandably reluctant to see their opinions memori-
alized in print. This description is based largely on extensive discussions with practi-
tioners actively engaged in the blue sky process, with state securities administrators in
several jurisdictions, and with the chairs of the Disclosure Standards Committee of the
North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) and the Subcommittee
on Disclosure Standards of the American Bar Association State Regulation of Securities
Committee. Needless to say, these persons bear no responsibility for the analysis and
conclusions set forth in this article.
7. Once again, surveying and sampling techniques used in connection with the re-
view of these prospectuses do not purport to be scientific. The review focused simply on
prospectuses judged by the author to be typical examples of the disclosure documents
used in state-registered public offerings of corporate equity securities and limited part-
nership interests, as well as a variety of comment letters submitted by state administra-
tors on specific offerings.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-1 to .12b-37(1986).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a)-(c), (g) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to .14c-7 (1986).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(f) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-l(a) to .14d-101 (1982).
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and insider trading,' 2 as well as the requirements imposed by the
Securities Act of 1933' 3 (the 1933 Act) on both registered and ex-
empt offerings of securities. In contrast, analysis of state disclosure
regulation requires consideration of a much narrower range of is-
sues. The state securities acts, the great majority of which are
modeled on the Uniform Securities Act, 14 contain no equivalents to
the 1934 Act's periodic reporting, proxy, and insider trading provi-
sions, and the states' brief foray into tender offer regulation was
aborted after the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Edgar v. MITE
Corp. 5 State securities regulation is almost entirely concerned with
the offering of securities for sale-the territory covered by the 1933
12. 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16a-1 to .16a-lI (1986).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982).
14. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 416, 7A U.L.A. 696 (1978). This act was approved by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1956, with amendments
approved in 1958. The Uniform Securities Act is conveniently reprinted at 1 Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) 5501-5573 (1986), and in L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SE-
CURITIES ACT (1976) [hereinafter L. Loss, COMMENTARY].
Thirty-nine jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Securities Act, although many
have done so with very substantial revisions. For example, the drafters of the Maryland
Securities Act, MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to -805 (1985), deleted all of
the Uniform Securities Act provisions relating to merit regulation of securities offerings
and investment adviser registration. See COMMITrEE TO STUDY THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE BLUE SKY LAW OF MARYLAND, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1962, at 4, 6 (1961); Miller, A Prospectus on the Maryland Securities Act,
23 MD. L. REV. 289, 292 (1963); Sargent, State Limited and Private Offering Exemptions: The
Maryland Experience in a National Perspective, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 496, 511-13 (1984) [here-
inafter Sargent, State Exemptions].
Two of the above-mentioned thirty-nine jurisdictions have adopted versions of a
revised Uniform Securities Act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1985, reprinted in UNIF. SEC. ACT (1985), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) 5601-5707 (1986). This version of the Act, however, has not yet been ap-
proved by the American Bar Association, and the chances of its widespread enactment
are slight. See Sargent, Some Thoughts on the Revised Uniform Securities Act, 14 SEC. REG. L.J.
62, 71-75 (1986) [hereinafter Sargent, Some Thoughts]. For discussion of the great diffi-
culties encountered in the revision process, see Hensley, The Development of a Revised Uni-
form Securities Act, 40 Bus. LAw. 721 (1985); Braisted, RUSA Draft: Regulation of Securities
by States, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 25, 1985, at 15, col. 4. For an overview of the provisions of the
revised act by one of the reporters for the project, see Titus, Uniform Securities Act (1985),
19 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 81 (1986).
In view of the dubious status of the revised act, this article will refer only to the
1956-58 version of the Uniform Securities Act.
15. 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (holding that Illinois takeover statute violated the Com-
merce Clause). For discussion of MITE's impact on the first-generation takeover stat-
utes, see Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus.
LAw. 671 (1985). This decision severely limited, if not destroyed, the states' ability to
regulate the tender offer phase of the takeover process. But see L.P. Acquisition Co. v.
Tyson, 772 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming the constitutionality of the application of
the Michigan first-generation statute to tender offers for securities not registered under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906
1030 [VOL. 46:1027
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Act-and with the licensing and supervision of securities profession-
als such as broker-dealers and investment advisers.' 6 Discussion of
state disclosure regulation, therefore, is largely a matter of analyz-
ing the affirmative disclosure obligations imposed by state securities
administrators on registered public offerings of securities. 17 That
analysis should begin with an overview of the state registration pro-
cess and its legal framework.
Every state securities act, like the 1933 Act, I" requires every
sale of securities in the state to be either registered or exempt from
registration.' 9 The state provisions differ from section 5 in that they
apply only to offers or sales in the state,20 but with respect to those
transactions the basic requirement is the same: the offeror or seller
(8th Cir. 1984) (affirming the constitutionality of a first-generation Minnesota statute
that had been substantially revised in light of MITE).
The virtual demise of these statutes led some jurisdictions to enact so-called sec-
ond-generation takeover statutes. These statutes, however, do not form part of the
states' securities laws, and they do not create any role for the state securities administra-
tors. Rather, they represent revisions of the state corporate laws to establish structural
requirements for or impediments to takeovers of corporations organized under those
laws. For discussion of these second-generation statutes and their differences from the
first-generation models, see ALI-ABA, NEW DIRECTIONS IN STATE TAKEOVER REGULA-
TION, THE SECOND GENERATION STATUTES (1986); Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legis-
lation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky, or Corporation Law Concepts?, 7 CORP. L. REV. 3
(1984); Sargent, Do the Second-Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause?
A Preliminary Inquiry, in TENDER OFFERS, DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARIES 75 (M.
Steinberg ed. 1985); Steinberg, The Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover Legislation, 12 SEC. REG.
L.J. 184 (1984). The constitutionality of one form of second-generation state takeover
regulation was recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
16. See, for example, the registration and supervisory provisions of the Uniform Se-
curities Act for broker-dealers, agents, and investment advisers. UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 201-
204.
17. This is not to say that the states play an insignificant part in the regulation of
disclosures in exempt transactions. Some states impose disclosure conditions additional
to or different from those required under the applicable federal exemption. See Hain-
sfurther, Summary of Blue Sky Exemptions Corresponding to Regulation D, 38 Sw. L.J. 989,
1002, 1008-09 (1984) (discussing Mississippi and Pennsylvania disclosure requirements
for certain exempt transactions); Sargent, State Exemptions, supra note 14, at 554-56 (dis-
cussing Maryland disclosure requirements for certain exempt transactions). State dis-
closure requirements for exempt transactions thus can be important with respect to
some transactions in some states, but in the aggregate, they are less important than the
affirmative disclosure obligations imposed upon public offerings as a condition of regis-
tration. This article, therefore, will concentrate on the latter topic.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
19. See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. ACT § 301 (providing that "[i]t is unlawful for any person to
offer or sell any security in this state unless (1) it is registered under this act or (2) the
security or transaction is exempted under section 402)." But see D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-
601 to -619 (1981) (requiring registration only of broker-dealers).
20. For discussion of this jurisdictional prerequisite, seeJ. LONG, supra note 1, at 3-2
to -118; L. Loss & E. CowETr, BLUE SKY LAw 186-217 (1958); Long, The Conflict of Laws
1987] 1031
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of securities must either register the securities or find some exemp-
tion from registration.
Most transactions are in fact exempt from state registration, 2'
just as most transactions are exempt from federal registration, and
the grounds for exemption at the two levels are often similar. The
federal and state exemptions, however, are by no means co-exten-
sive. For example, many offerings subject to registration at the fed-
eral level are exempt from registration at the state level. This
category includes offerings by issuers listed on a national stock ex-
change or, in a few states, on the National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotations National Market System (NAS-
DAQ/NMS), or by issuers that meet specified "blue chip" criteria.22
Conversely, some offerings exempted from federal registration pur-
suant to regulation D23 or some other federal exemption 24 may not
be able to qualify for a coordinating state exemption in every juris-
diction in which the offering is made, and thus may be subject to
"registration by qualification" in one or more states.25
Provisions of the Uniform Securities Act, Or When Does a Transaction "Take Place in This
State?"-Part 1, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 781 (1978).
21. For an overview of the state exemptions, see J. LONG, supra note 1, at 4-2 to 5-
149. For a detailed discussion of their status and use in a fairly typical Uniform Securi-
ties Act jurisdiction, see Hansell & Neumann, The Iowa Uniform Securities Act Exemptions,
Part I The Securities Exemptions, 2 J. CORP. L. 437 (1977); The Iowa Uniform Securities Act
Exemptions, Part I." The Transaction Exemptions, 3J. CORP. L. 437 (1978). For a similar
survey in a non-Uniform Securities Act jurisdiction, see Lipsman, Exemptions Under the
Texas Securities Act: A Logical Framework for the Practicing Attorney, 22 Hous. L. REV. 725
(1985). For discussion of problems of policy and practice with the state exemptions, see
Sargent, State Exemptions, supra note 14, at 498-511.
22. For a survey of these exemptions and the current debate over them, see Warren,
The Status of the Marketplace Exemption from State Securities Registration, 41 Bus. LAw. 1511
(1986) [hereinafter Warren, Marketplace Exemption].
"National Market System Securities" are defined at 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 lAa2-1
(1986), pursuant to § 1 A(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 781A (1982).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.506 (1986).
24. An example is the statutory exemption for nonpublic offerings under § 4(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
25. "Registration by qualification" is the Uniform Securities Act registration device
used for offerings not registered with the SEC and not eligible for "registration by noti-
fication," a short-form registration device available to issuers that meet specified earn-
ings and stability criteria. UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 302, 303.
The movement to develop uniform state exemptions corresponding to regulation
D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1986), has generated significant controversy, but has also
resulted in NASAA's adoption of a "Uniform Limited Offering Exemption" (ULOE).
The ULOE is published at NASAA Reports (CCH) 6201 (Jan. 17, 1984). While the
ULOE has provided a framework for greater uniformity, it has not been adopted in
every state, and there is still substantial variation among the versions of ULOE that have
been adopted in others. For overviews of the patterns of adoption, see Hainsfurther,
1032 [VOL. 46:1027
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There is a substantial area of state-federal overlap, however,
with respect to initial public offerings by corporations and limited
partnerships. These are the offerings usually subject to both state
and federal registration. Many are likely to receive a relatively de-
tailed review from the SEC, and many are likely to be looked at care-
fully by some of the state administrators. 26
The procedural mechanism for simultaneous state and federal
registration is relatively simple. A public offering submitted for fed-
eral registration ordinarily will also be submitted for "registration
by coordination" in every state in which the offering is to be sold.27
Registration by coordination ties state effectiveness to federal effec-
tiveness, permitting simultaneous effectiveness at both levels while
allowing the state administrator time to review the offering during
the federal waiting period.28
If the state administrator objects to the offering on one or more
of the statutory grounds for denial of registration, he or she may
issue a stop order denying effectiveness to the offering.29 As in the
supra note 17, at 991-1021; Halloran & Linderman, Coordinating State Securities Laws with
Regulation D and Federal Integration Policy: State Limited Offering Exemptions and Integration
Standards, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, BLUE SKY LAWS, STATE REGULATION OF SECURI-
TIES 1985, at 447 (1985); MacEwan, Blue Sky Regulation of Reg D Offerings, 18 REV. SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 103 (1985). For discussion of the difficulties experienced in one
state with accommodating the state and federal exemptive schemes, see Honig, Massa-
chusetts Securities Regulation: In Search of the Fulcrum, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 469, 479-95
(1984).
26. Report on State Merit Regulation, supra note 2, at 796-801.
27. The term "registration by coordination" is used in Uniform Securities Act juris-
dictions. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 303. Similar terminology is used in non-Uniform Act
jurisdictions. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25111 (West Supp. 1987) ("qualification by
coordination").
28. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 303(c) describes the conditions for coordination of the timing
of state and federal effectiveness. For discussion of the practical importance of this re-
gistration device, see L. Loss, COMMENTARY, supra note 14, at 51-55; Sargent, Some
Thoughts, supra note 14, at 73.
29. The grounds for denial of effectiveness are set out in UNIF. SEC. ACT § 306. Sec-
tion 306(a)(2)(F) defines specific "merit" grounds for denial of effectiveness by permit-
ting the administrator to issue a stop order if "the offering has been or would be made
with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sellers' discounts, commissions, or
other compensation, or promoters' profits or participation, or unreasonable amounts or
kinds of options." The drafters specifically excluded from the Act, however, a general
requirement that the offering be "fair, just, and equitable" as a condition of effective-
ness. See L. Loss, COMMENTARY, supra note 14, at 83-84. Some Uniform Securities Act
jurisdictions, however, have added language granting the administrator authority to
deny effectiveness on "fair, just, and equitable" grounds. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 551.28(1)(e) (West 1986). There is also some dispute over whether UNIF. SEC. ACT
§ 306(a)(2)(F), which permits denial of effectiveness on the ground that "the offering
has worked or tended to work a fraud upon purchasers or would so operate," constitutes
a general grant of merit authority similar to a "fair, just, and equitable" standard. For
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federal scheme, however, issuance of a stop order is rare;3 ° if the
problems with the offering are insurmountable, the issuer ordinarily
will withdraw the application for registration3 ' and "sell around"
that state or those states in which the offering has not "cleared." 2
The inability to clear in one or more states is rarely fatal to the suc-
cess of a nationwide public offering, 33 although a projected inability
to clear in several highly regulatory jurisdictions with large numbers
of investors such as California or Texas may send the issuer and
underwriter back to the drawing board.
While there is always some potential for compliance problems
at the state level, the nature and intensity of the review received in
the state varies substantially.3 4 It varies, first of all, with the charac-
negative responses to this suggestion, see Report on State Merit Regulation, supra note 2, at
808 n. 136; Honig, supra note 25, at 474-76. But see ERP, supra note 3, at 809 (three states
claim that their "work-a-fraud" standard constitutes a "fair and equitable" test).
The administrator's authority to deny effectiveness on the grounds of inadequate
disclosure is derived from UNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(2)(A), which allows denial if the re-
gistration statement "is incomplete in any material respect or contains any statement
which was, in light of the circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading
with respect to any material fact."
30. According to Professor Loss, the "heavy artillery" of § 8(d) of the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1982), which authorizes the issuance of stop orders, "is
reserved for flagrant cases." L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 128
(1983) [hereinafter L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS]. The same is true in state registration. Bar-
tell, supra note 5, at § 24.04(11) ("stop orders are rarely used").
31. Bartell, supra note 5, at § 24.03(4)(b); Shapiro & Sachs, Blue Sky Law and Practice:
An Overview, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 13 (1974).
32. P. FASS & D. WITrNER, supra note 1, at 2-5. An alternative to "selling around" a
recalcitrant state is to withdraw the application for registration by coordination, which
the administrator would deny in order to prevent automatic state effectiveness upon
federal effectiveness, UNIF. SEC. ACT § 303(c), and to submit an application for registra-
tion by qualification. A registration by qualification becomes effective only when the
administrator so orders. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 304(c). The switch from coordination to
qualification would allow counsel and the administrator time to resolve the problem
without the time pressure created by coordinated state-federal effectiveness. P. FASS &
D. WIT-'NER, supra note 1, at 2-5; Liebolt, State Securities Registration Requirements: Forms,
Procedures, Requirements, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, BLUE SKY LAws, STATE REGULA-
TION OF SECURITIES 1985, at 376 (1985). For discussion of the term "cleared" with re-
spect to federal registration, see Comment, State Securities Regulation: Merit Review of
Foreign Equity Offerings, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 939, 939-40 n.5 (1985).
33. See Makens, Who Speaks for the Investor? An Evaluation of the Assault on Merit Regula-
tion, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 435, 459 (1984) (expressing doubt about the claim that merit
regulation "kills" offerings); but seeJ. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEw BUSINESS
PROMOTIONS 35 (1971) (stating that restrictions "may force some promoters to give up a
plan for a public offering").
34. Report on State Merit Regulation, supra note 2, at 789-90, 836-38. For a survey of
perceptions of the relative stringency of the various state regulatory systems, see Brandi,
Securities Practitioners and Blue Sky Laws: A Survey of Comments and a Ranking of States by
Stringency of Regulation, 10J. CORP. L. 689, 703-07 (1985).
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teristics of the offering. Low-priced, speculative offerings, usually
described as "penny stock" offerings, are likely to be scrutinized
carefully.3 5 Consequently, many such offerings are never submitted
for registration in heavily regulatory states. Other types of offer-
ings, furthermore, may receive an intensive review if the under-
writer is not well-established, the issuer or its principals have a
disciplinary record, or the offering is of a type that has been present-
ing enforcement problems.3 6
The type of review received will also vary from state to state. A
primary basis for variation will be the nature and extent of the indi-
vidual states' review authority. In the so-called "free" states such as
Colorado and Nevada, there is a blanket exemption for SEC-regis-
tered offerings, so such offerings will not be reviewed at all in those
jurisdictions.3 7 In so-called "disclosure-only" jurisdictions, such as
Illinois, Maryland, and Connecticut, the administrator may review
only the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosure, and may not deny
effectiveness to the offering on merit grounds.3 8 As a practical mat-
ter, the level of review applied in these jurisdictions is highly varied.
Many registrations by coordination are hardly reviewed. In con-
trast, registration statements for offerings exempted from federal
registration but registered in the state by qualification tend to be
scrutinized closely.39 The most intensive scrutiny, however, is likely
to be received from state administrators possessing the authority to
review both the substantive merits of the offering and the adequacy
and accuracy of the disclosures.4 ° As will be explained in detail be-
low,4 ' the review received in those states is likely to be a complex
35. For discussions of the states' concerns with such offerings, see NASAA Investor
Alert, Penny Stock Frauds, NASAA Reports (CCH) 8206 (Aug. 1984); Leefeldt, Blank
Check Offerings Lure Investors, Wall St. J., June 16, 1986, at 15, col. 1; States Stop Playing
Detective for Investors, Bus. WEEK, July 16, 1984, at 131.
36. A current example of an offering likely to attract intensive scrutiny is a so-called
"blind-pool" or "blank-check" offering by an issuer without any assets that will use the
proceeds of the offering to acquire a privately-held business. The blind-pool offering, in
short, allows the private company to go public without government scrutiny. See
Leefeldt, supra note 35, at 15, col. 1.
37. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-113(2)(n) (Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.075
(1986).
38. For discussion of Illinois' shift from a merit jurisdiction to a disclosure-only juris-
diction, see Sosin & Fein, The Landmark 1983 Amendments to the Illinois Securities Law, 72
ILL. BJ. 196 (1983). For discussion of Maryland's status as a disclosure-only jurisdic-
tion, see authorities cited supra note 14. On Connecticut's status, see ERP, supra note 3,
at 804, 810.
39. See supra notes 25, 32.
40. See supra note 29 for discussion of the statutory bases of merit review authority.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 96-134.
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amalgam of merit and disclosure reviews.
A second basis for state-to-state variation is the extent of state
administrative resources. The great majority of states possess the
statutory authority to engage in both merit and disclosure review,
but as a practical matter only a few states possess the ability to regu-
late public offerings.4 2 Many states simply lack the personnel and
the financial resources to carry out rigorous, independent reviews.
At any one time, only ten to fifteen states are likely to comment ex-
tensively on the registration application and require compliance
with specific disclosure or merit standards.43 The roster of heavily
regulatory states, furthermore, changes frequently, since legislative
developments, 44 funding shifts, and turnover at both supervisory
and staff levels can rapidly alter the way a state office behaves.45
In short, only a relatively small number of states are likely to
engage in serious regulation of public offerings. Their ability to reg-
ulate will depend upon both the extent of their statutory authority
and their administrative resources. Their inclination to review will
depend largely upon the nature of the offering. But once several
states decide to review an offering, the level of scrutiny is likely to be
as intense as that received from the SEC. The review will also be
independent of the SEC's, 4 6 primarily because of some states' obli-
gation to evaluate the offering in light of their merit standards. It is
vital to recognize, however, that the review received in the heavily
regulatory states will not be purely a "merit review."' 47 Administra-
tors in these jurisdictions will employ a complex regulatory method-
ology in which merit and disclosure techniques are inextricably
intertwined. To understand that methodology, it is necessary to ex-
42. For surveys listing the states that consider themselves merit jurisdictions, see
ERP, supra note 3, at 803-11. For a comparative analysis of the resources of the state
securities administrations and the uses to which those resources are put, see id. at 786-
800.
43. See Bartell, supra note 5, at § 24.07(7); Report on State Merit Regulation, supra note
2, at 790 n.25.
44. For discussion of the impact of legislative change in Illinois and other jurisdic-
tions, see Sargent, Challenge, supra note 2 at 367-77.
45. For discussion of the impact of personnel changes in one state, see Honig, supra
note 25, at 471.
46. This is not to say that state examiners will not consult with SEC examiners or
that they will ignore SEC requirements. The contrary is ordinarily true. The state ex-
aminer is, however, fully capable of conducting an independent review that may lead to
special state disclosure requirements.
47. See infia text accompanying notes 96-134; see also Makens, supra note 33, at 441
("when a merit administrator provides comments on an offering, the comments are
more likely to relate to the adequacy of disclosure than to merit issues").
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amine more closely the basic concepts of "merit" and "disclosure"
regulation.
II. "IT MUST NOT BE THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT DISCLOSURE AND
MERIT ARE TWO GODS THAT SIT ON SEPARATE BUT EQUAL
THRONES." 4 8 -LouIs LOSS
A. Defining the Difference
With this evocative phrase, Professor Loss drew on his unique
experience as both principal draftsman of the Uniform Securities
Act4 9 and principal commentator on the federal securities laws 50 to
suggest that an absolute distinction between disclosure and merit
regulation is misleading, a theme we are about to explore in much
greater detail. He also insisted, however, that "there is a difference"
between disclosure and merit regulation,5' a point that cannot be
denied.
The system of disclosure regulation employed by the SEC is an
inheritance of the Progressive faith in the value of disclosure as a
remedy to social and economic wrongs. 52 This faith was expressed
not only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century tradition
of muckraking,5" but also in the evolution of the investigative hear-
ing as a technique of exposing abuses,54 and, most importantly, in
48. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 30, at 36.
49. UNIF. SEC. ACT, Official Prefatory Note, reprinted in 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
5500A. For discussion of Professor Loss' critical role in the drafting of the Uniform
Securities Act, see Blair-Smith, More on the Project for a Uniform Securities Act, 11 Bus. LAW.
111 (1956).
50. For discussion of Professor Loss' role in the development of federal securities
regulation, see Macey, Book Review, 93 YALE LJ. 1173, 1173-74 (1984).
51. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 30, at 36.
52. For extensive discussions of Progressive ideology, see D. AARON, MEN OF GOOD
HOPE (1951); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM, FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955); M.
WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1949); R.
WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967). For a critical analysis of Progressive
financial and economic reform programs as essentially conservative efforts to protect
business interests, restrain competition and preserve economic inequality, see G.
KOLKO, THE AGE OF CONSERVATISM (1963); RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916
(1965); MAIN CURRENTS IN MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY (1976).
53. For discussion of the muckraking tradition, see R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 52, at
186-95.
54. One such investigation was the 1912 Pujo Committee Hearings, which exposed
the so-called "money trust" and other abuses in the financial markets. See C. COWING,
POPULISTS, PLUNGERS AND PROGRESSIVES 52-56 (1965). The Committee's findings were
popularized by Louis D. Brandeis in his famous work, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How
THE BANKERS USE IT (1914). These proceedings had a New Deal echo in the dramatic
1933 hearings conducted by Ferdinand Pecora with respect to the activities of the Insull
public utility interests, the National City Company, and J.P. Morgan and Company. See
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the development of legislation designed to mandate disclosure of
material information to the public.55 The faith in disclosure was
expressed most succinctly in Louis Brandeis' oft-quoted phrase:
"[S]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman." 56 The 1933 Act and much of the federal
securities legislation reflected this optimistic assessment of the value
of full disclosure. 7
Progressive disclosure legislation, nevertheless, was in many
ways quite modest in its ambitions and its effects. Government's
role would be confined to setting standards for disclosure; it would
not be a guarantor of quality or fairness, and it would not mandate
the substantive terms of private economic relations. This distinc-
tion is part of the SEC's legacy. That agency's primary function, at
least under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, is to maintain a system of
"truth in securities.""8 The 1933 Act, its attendant rules and regula-
J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 20-38 (1982) [hereinafter J.
SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION].
55. For discussion of the importance of government-mandated disclosure in Pro-
gressive economic reform programs, see V. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA
353-54 (1970); C. COWING, supra note 54, at 227-35.
56. BRANDEIS, supra note 54, at 92; see also id. at 92-108 (explaining "what publicity
can do"). On Brandeis' role in the development of early twentieth-century regulation,
see T. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION, 80-142 (1984).
57. This legislation also reflects a political compromise with the forces that opposed
adoption of federal securities regulation. The chances of enactment of disclosure-based
legislation were far greater than enactment of merit-based legislation on the model of
the state blue sky laws. See M. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 57
(1970); J. SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54, at 56-57. The compromise im-
plicit in the adoption of a disclosure-based system was harshly criticized by William 0.
Douglas, then a professor at Yale Law School, who doubted that most investors had "the
time, money, or intelligence to assimilate the mass of information in the registration
statement," and who described the Securities Act of 1933 as a "nineteenth-century piece
of legislation" that did not "perfect a plan for control of our present forms of organiza-
tion." Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE LJ. 521, 528-30 (1933).
Note, however, that the drafters of this legislation were influenced as much by Felix
Frankfurter's ideas about the importance to modern industrial society of independent
administrative agencies staffed by experts as by the "simpler slogans of Louis Brandeis."
J. SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54, at 58. Perhaps the classic statement of this
perspective was written by James Landis, Frankfurter's protege, one of the drafters of
the Securities Act of 1933 and an SEC Commissioner. J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS (1938). On Landis' contribution to federal securities regulation, see T. Mc-
CRAW, supra note 56, at 153-209. The Frankfurter-Landis model of the behavior of ad-
ministrative agencies has been strongly criticized. For a survey of the literature, see
Gifford, The New Deal Regulatoy Model. A History of Criticism and Refinements, 68 MINN. L.
REV. 299, 312-19 (1983).
58. Certain aspects of federal securities regulation, however, clearly constitute more
than mandatory disclosure systems. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
15 U.S.C. §§ 79a to 79z-6 (1982), for example, brought about a fundamental reorgani-
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tions, and the SEC registration process can be understood as an en-
gine designed to extract information from the issuer and the
underwriter. Theoretically, therefore, the SEC will not, indeed can-
not, deny registration to an offering that appears to be egregiously
unfair to the public investor, or that presents an extraordinary
amount of risk, so long as all information material to the offering
has been disclosed. As will be argued below, 59 this basic point
needs some qualification, but its essence remains true.
The establishment of a disclosure-based federal securities regu-
latory system in 1933 can be described as a rejection of the first
indigenous tradition of American securities regulation, the merit-
based system prevalent in the midwestern states, in favor of a disclo-
sure-based system derived from a British model and from the
broader tradition of Progressive disclosure legislation.6 ° Merit reg-
ulation in 1933, as well as merit regulation in 1987, contemplated a
far greater degree of intervention into private economic decision-
making than did the form of disclosure regulation adopted in the
1933 Act.
In essence, merit regulation is a paternalistic system of securi-
ties regulation permitting the administrator to deny effectiveness to
a registration statement if the terms of the offering, the structure of
the issuer, or any associated transactions do not (i) ensure a fair re-
lationship between promoters and public investors, and (ii) provide
public investors with a reasonable relation between risk and re-
turn.6 ' State administrators have used merit-based securities acts to
erect a baroque, ever-changing network of standards and require-
zation of the financial structure of that industry. See R. DEBEDTS, THE NEW DEAL'S SEC
112-43 (1964); E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 325-37
(1966); M. PARRISH, supra note 57, at 145-78;J. SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION, supra note
54, at 127-38. The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (1982),
furthermore, contains a number of substantive regulatory provisions that go far beyond
the mere requirement of full disclosure of material information. See L. Loss, FUNDAMEN-
TALS, supra note 30, at 59. The Act, nonetheless, stops far short of imposing a full-scale
fairness standard for investment company transactions. See J. SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMA-
TION, supra note 54, at 230-31.
For discussion of other ways in which federal securities regulation may be said to
serve goals beyond "truth in securities," see infra text accompanying notes 83-92.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 83-84.
60. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 30, at 35-36; M. PARRISH, supra note 57, at 57;
J. SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54, at 56-57.
61. This definition is derived from Report on State Merit Regulation, supra note 2, at
829. In the interests of full disclosure, it should be stated that the present writer was the
principal author of that report and hence of this definition. Id. at 785. For discussion of
the different definitions of merit regulation, and of the difficulty in arriving at a consen-
sus definition, see id. at 795.
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ments that manage to cover both fundamental questions of corpo-
rate governance 62 and such minutiae as the amount of real estate
brokerage commissions that may be paid for the resale of property
acquired by a real estate limited partnership.63
State merit regulation, like federal disclosure regulation, drew
upon late nineteenth and early twentieth century Progressive reform
impulses.64 Many of the central characteristics of that ideology were
present in the merit-based blue sky statutes: a sense of victimization
of the public by financial interests,65 a suspicion of Wall Street,6 6
and a trust in the expertise of government administrators.67 Merit
regulation, however, represents a more extreme version of those
impulses than does federal disclosure regulation, and it was cer-
tainly perceived as more threatening by at least some business inter-
ests.68 Merit statutes, after all, grant state administrators vast
62. See infra text accompanying notes 112-117.
63. NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs § IV.F, NASAA Reports
(CCH) 3604 (Nov. 20, 1986).
64. For discussion of the blue sky movement that led to the enactment of the first
state securities statutes in the period immediately before and during World War I, see V.
CAROSSO, supra note 55, at 156-64; C. COWING, supra note 54, at 67-74; M. PARRISH, supra
note 57, at 5-20. For discussion of the origin of the term "blue sky law," see L. Loss &
E. COWETr, supra note 20, at 7 n.22. For a discussion of late nineteenth-century antece-
dents to this legislation, see Nash, Government and Business: A Case Study of State Regulation
of Corporate Securities, 38 Bus. HIST. REV. 144 (1964).
65. This sense of victimization is clearly expressed in the literature of the blue sky
movement. See, e.g., Brach, The Blue Sky Law, 3 MARQ. L. REV. 142, 147 (1918-19) ("The
purpose of the... Blue Sky Law was ... to protect the innocent investors from being...
defrauded by the wily, crafty salesman of spurious stock."); Dolley, The Kansas "Blue Sky
Law, " 75 CENT. LJ. 221 (1912) ("At the time this law went into effect there were be-
tween four and six millions of dollars annually being taken from Kansas .... ").
66. Suspicion of Wall Street seems to have been common in the agrarian states of
the Midwest, but the most direct focus of resentment in the blue sky movement seems to
have been itinerant confidence men peddling spurious oil and mining company shares.
C. COWING, supra note 54, at 73. It is fair to say, however, that the blue sky movement
was also part of a larger reform movement preoccupied with perceived abuses by the
"money trust" and investment bankers, evils frequently personified by Wall Street. For
discussion of the ideology of this broadly-based movement, see C. COWING, supra note
53, at 25-74.
67. A classic expression of this aspect of Progressive ideology is C. MCCARTHY, THE
WISCONSIN IDEA (1912). McCarthy's description of the Wisconsin blue sky law is partic-
ularly evocative: "The [blue sky] commission is given the authority to determine in a
scientific way whether certain issues are or are not reasonable . . . " Id. at 72. J.N.
Dolley of Kansas, the first blue sky commissioner, emphasized the role of experts in the
administration of the state securities law: "Whenever we get an application from a com-
pany we get what information we desire and then it is submitted to one of our various
state institutions or departments, who are experts in that line, and we receive their ad-
vice and opinion regarding the matter." Dolley, supra note 65, at 222.
68. For discussion of the assault by financial interests, particularly the Investment
Bankers Association, on the early blue sky statutes and other attempts at financial re-
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discretion to determine which investment opportunities may be
presented to the residents of a state and which may not.69 Regard-
less of how one feels about the merits of merit regulation, it must be
acknowledged that it permits a type of intervention into private eco-
nomic decisionmaking different from that permitted under the fed-
eral securities laws.
The basic difference between merit and disclosure regulation
can be illustrated through a comparison of disclosure and merit ap-
proaches to the common problem of dilution. SEC regulation S-
K, 70 which sets out the standard instructions for completing regis-
tration statements under the 1933 Act, treats the dilution resulting
from the difference between the public offering price and the price
previously paid by insiders entirely as a matter of disclosure:
Where common equity securities are being registered and
there is substantial disparity between the public offering
price and the effective cash cost to officers, directors, pro-
moters and affiliated persons of common equity acquired
by them in transactions during the past five years, or which
they have the right to acquire ... there shall be included [in
the prospectus] a comparison of the public contribution
under the proposed public offering and the effective cash
contribution of such persons.71
The dilutive effect on the public investors' equity of the dispropor-
tion between the public offering price and the price paid by insiders
in previous transactions is thus obviously of substantial concern to
the SEC,72 but it is treated only as a matter for disclosure.
form, see V. CAROSSO, supra note 55, at 165-92. The Securities Industry Association, the
successor to the Investment Bankers Association, has maintained this tradition of oppos-
ing state merit regulation. See Myriad of Approaches to Uniformity of State Regulation Urged at
Hearing, 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1737-38 (1983); NASAA Adopts ULOE, Endorses
Uniformity, Focuses on Threats to Merit Regulation, 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1833-34.
See also 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 320 (1986).
69. In the words of one commentator, merit statutes "embrace the concept that the
state has an interest in protecting its citizens from bad investments." Long, State Securities
Regulation: An Overview, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 541, 548 (1979).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10-.801 (1986).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 229.506 (1986). Item 506 provides further that:
In such cases . . . the following shall be disclosed:
(a) The net tangible book value per share before and after the distribution;
(b) The amount of the increase in such net tangible book value per share at-
tributable to the cash payments made by purchasers of the shares being of-
fered; and
(c) The amount of the immediate dilution from the public offering price
which will be absorbed by such purchasers.
72. An important early manifestation of the SEC's concern with disclosure of price
differential and dilution is In the Matter of Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648
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This problem is handled very differently in merit jurisdictions.
First of all, a merit administrator may be able to deny registration to
an offering on fairness grounds if the amount of dilution of the pub-
lic investors' equity is too high. A Wyoming regulation, for example,
provides that in a "fair, just and equitable" offering of common
stock, the offering price of the securities offered to the public shall
not "result in excessive dilution . . . in the hands of the public.' 73
The regulation does not specify how much dilution will be consid-
ered excessive, but the intent is clear. If there is too much dilution
of the public investors' equity, registration in the state can be
denied.
A disproportion between the public offering price and the pro-
moters' price also may result in the promoters' stock being charac-
terized as "cheap stock."' 74  If the stock is so characterized,
effectiveness may be tied to a reduction of the offering price or of
the amount of cheap stock to be outstanding after the offering. A
Missouri regulation demonstrates why this may be the case.75
The regulation begins by defining cheap stock as
[s]ecurities sold or issued to promoters or underwriters for
a consideration substantially different from the public of-
fering price within two years before the filing of the [Mis-
souri] registration statement, and securities sold or issued
to any persons for a consideration other than cash within
two . . years of the filing of the registration statement, or
to be sold or issued to such persons ... 76
After defining cheap stock, the regulation goes on to state that
"[r]egistration of equity securities... where cheap stock has been or
will be issued may be looked upon with disfavor as substantially un-
fair, unjust, inequitable or oppressive .... .. With this general
principle stated, the regulation then provides an escape hatch by de-
claring that "[c]heap stock is presumed to be justified ' 78 if the fol-
(1945). For discussion of the importance of this case to the SEC's current disclosure
policies, see T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 73-75 (1985).
73. Reg. Wyo. Sec. Div., ch. V, § 3(f), reprinted in 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 66,433,
at 57,505-06 (Apr. 1987).
74. For a critical discussion of state cheap stock requirements, see Report on State
Merit Regulation, supra note 2, at 839-43; cf. Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 899, 912-13 (1982) (defending state cheap stock limitations).
75. Mo. CODE REGS. § 30-52.070, reprinted in 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 35,457
(Feb. 1987).
76. Mo. CODE REGS. § 30-52.070(1), reprinted in 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 35,457
(Feb. 1987).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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lowing conditions (inter alia) are met.
The number of shares of cheap stock does not exceed fifty
per cent ... of the shares (including shares issuable upon
conversion) to be outstanding at the completion of the
public offering which is the subject of the application ...
[and] [t]he price paid per share for the shares of cheap
stock is at least fifty per cent ... of the public offering price
per share.79
In order for the public offering to be registered in Missouri, there-
fore, it may be necessary to make a downward adjustment of the
public offering price or the amount of stock being offered.
The merit administrator may wish not only to limit the amount
of cheap stock, but also to require the remaining amount of cheap
stock to be escrowed for a period of years, with the stock to be can-
celled at the end of that period unless the corporation's earnings or
the stock's market price reach specified levels.80 The Texas provi-
sion defines the administrator's escrow authority in general terms:
In circumstances in which there is substantial disparity be-
tween the consideration paid or to be paid for such securi-
ties by promoters and the public offering price, the
Commissioner may require as a condition to the registra-
tion of securities an escrow of all or part of the securities
issued to such promoters under an agreement providing
for the impoundment of such securities for a reasonable
period of time, subject to such conditions as the Commis-
sioner may require which may include, in the discretion of
the Commissioner, cancellation of the securities if the con-
ditions for release from escrow are not attained.8 '
This Texas regulation, like the Wyoming and Missouri regulations
just quoted, shows that the necessity to comply with merit require-
ments can lead to substantial changes in the fundamental terms of
the offering.
This comparison of the state and federal approaches to dilution
and cheap stock, furthermore, proves the point that there is in fact a
79. Mo. CODE REGS. § 30-52.070(l)(B), (C), reprinted in 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
35,457, at 30,530 (Feb. 1987).
80. For examples of such "earn-out" provisions, see NASAA g Statement of Policy,
Cheap Stock § III, NASAA Reports (CCH) 804 (Apr. 23, 1987). This statement of
policy has been intensely controversial and is in the process of revision. See Report on
State Merit Regulation, supra note 2, at 839-43.
81. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3(5), reprinted in 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
55,574, at 49,519 (Dec. 1986).
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real difference between disclosure and merit regulation. 2 In brief,
the primary goal of merit regulation is to affect directly economic
behavior, and not just the disclosure of information about that
behavior.
B. Points of Connection
The epigram quoted at the beginning of this section suggests,
however, that the differences may not be as profound as the forego-
ing discussion may indicate, and that there are significant points of
connection. This may be demonstrated, first of all, by reexamining
the goals of federal disclosure regulation.
The avowed goal is timely disclosure of the information inves-
tors need to make informed decisions about purchasing securities,
granting proxies, or tendering shares. By mandating such disclo-
sure, the law attempts to redress the informational imbalance be-
tween promoters and investors. The assumptions implicit in this
goal, of course, are not without question and have indeed been
harshly criticized.8 3 The effects of the federal mandatory disclosure
system, however, cannot be defined (or criticized) solely in terms of
the goal of producing informed individual investors. The federal
disclosure system also has a substantive or normative impact on eco-
nomic behavior.
For example, one of the effects of required compliance with a
mandatory disclosure system is the creation of incentives to forego,
rescind, or restructure transactions or relationships that cannot
stand the light of day. As part of the "house cleaning" needed
before any company goes public, 4 unproductive, inequitable, or
simply embarrassing self-dealing transactions between insiders and
the company may be eliminated. Similarly, compensation policies
may be revised and stock option programs rationalized and made
more equitable. The management team may be improved through
the addition of new board members whose names will strengthen
the prospectus. Admittedly, these effects are largely marginal, but
they are nevertheless real, and they show that disclosure regulation
82. Professor Loss draws a similar comparison between federal disclosure and state
merit approaches to the issuance of options. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 30, at
36-37.
83. See authorities cited infra note 147.
84. For practitioners' descriptions of this "house-cleaning" process, see Simons, Pre-
Offering Planning, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, How TO PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OF-
FERING 59-64 (1986); A. Sachs, Complex Capital Structures, IPO Housekeeping and Blue Sky
Issues 2-17 (unpublished manuscript on file with the Maryland Law Review).
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can influence the way economic entities behave as well as what they
disclose.
The goal of altering behavior has perhaps been more clear-cut,
and certainly more self-conscious, under the 1934 Act. In the late
1970s the SEC used its control over proxy solicitation as a means of
encouraging reform of corporate governance. 5 Nothing in the fed-
eral securities laws gave the SEC direct jurisdiction over the compo-
sition or functioning of boards of directors or any other corporate
governance mechanisms, but as a result of its own experience with
questionable payments casess6 and the general agitation over corpo-
rate social responsibility, 7 the SEC began to explore ways in which
it could influence substantive change in corporate governance.
The SEC's efforts in this area did not have a decisive effect on
corporate governance, since expression of its most serious concerns
seldom proceeded beyond the level of public hearings and hortatory
statements.8 8 The SEC did, however, use its control over the proxy
disclosure mechanism to require more detailed disclosures concern-
ing the independence of boards of directors, thereby creating incen-
tives for the use of independent directors.8 9 Similarly, the agency's
85. For a generally favorable discussion of the impact of this and other SEC pro-
grams and policies on corporate governance, see M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL
AFFAIRS 13-72 (1983) [hereinafter M. STEINBERG, INTERNAL AFFAIRS]. For generally criti-
cal discussion, see R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION, THE SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA 139-86 (1982); Kripke, The SEC,
Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAw. 173 (1981); Wolfson, A Critique of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY LJ. 119 (1981). For an argument that the
SEC's corporate governance initiatives were insufficiently responsive to the need for
fundamental reform, see J. SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54, at 534-51.
86. See generally SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE
AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1976). For
discussion of the SEC's experience in this area, see M. STEINBERG, INTERNAL AFFAIRS,
supra note 85, at 55-59, 105-08.
87. There is an enormous literature on the legal structures of corporate social re-
sponsibility, whether that responsibility is defined in terms of accountability to share-
holders, other corporate constituencies, or society at large. See, e.g., R. NADER, M.
GREEN &J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); C. STONE, WHERE THE
LAW ENDS (1975); Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977); Goldschmid, The
Greening of the Boardroom: Reflections on Corporate Responsibility, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 15 (1973). For discussion of the SEC's response to this movement, see Selig-
man, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Democracy, 3 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1
(1978).
88. For discussion of the hortatory character of the SEC's activities during this pe-
riod, see J. SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54, at 548-51; M. STEINBERG, INTER-
NAL AFFAIRS, supra note 85, at 18-28.
89. See generally Rules on Shareholder Communications, Exchange Act Release No.
15,384, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 81,766 (Dec. 6, 1978)
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use of its enforcement powers to force disclosure of questionable
payments created strong incentives for the abandonment of that
practice.90 The SEC also responded to the concern for corporate
social responsibility by institutionalizing and to some extent liberal-
izing the process by which shareholders could force corporate man-
agement to include their shareholder proposals-usually relating to
social or political concerns-in management proxy statements. 9' In
short, the SEC's corporate governance initiatives demonstrated how
control over corporate disclosure could be used to affect corporate
behavior.9" The SEC stopped short of exerting all of the disclosure
system's potential leverage, and the post-1980 Commission has
shown no inclination to resume the corporate governance initiative
in its most obvious form, but the essential point should be clear: the
SEC's disclosure-based regulatory system has been used to effect
substantive change in private economic relationships and prospec-
tively to influence corporate behavior.
Disclosure regulation as practiced by the SEC, therefore, can-
not be described as purely antithetical to merit regulation. The nor-
mative goals and effects of this mandatory disclosure system show
that merit and disclosure, to some extent, occupy relative positions
on a single regulatory continuum. The functional relationship of
(requiring full disclosure of relationships between individual directors and the corpora-
tion). Note that the SEC also influenced the composition of corporate boards through
enforcement actions that resulted in the restructuring of corporate boards to include a
majority of nonmanagement directors and to establish independent audit committees.
M. STEINBERG, INTERNAL AFFAIRS, supra note 85, at 31.
90. SeeJ. SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54, at 539-44.
91. For discussion of the background to these developments and a defense of the use
of the SEC's proxy rules to facilitate dissemination of shareholder proposals of a social
or political character, see Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-existence with Society,
60 GEO. L. J. 57 (1971); Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign
Gi, 69 Micii. L. REV. 421 (1971); Schwartz, Proxy Power and Social Goals-How Campaign
GM Succeeded, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 764 (1971). For critiques of these rules, see Dent,
SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1985); Liebler, A
Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV. 425 (1984). The SEC's
current shareholder proposal rule is 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1986).
92. Something like this point has been noticed by other commentators. See M.
STEINBERG, INTERNAL AFFAIRS, supra note 85, at 29 ("the Commission's disclosure
polices.., have not only had an effect of deterring unlawful or questionable conduct but
have played a positive role in influencing the establishment of improved standards of
conduct"); R. STEVENSON, CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION-SECRECY, ACCESS AND Dis-
CLOSURE 81-82 (1980) ("Today the disclosure requirements of the securities laws are
used, in a variety of ways, for the explicit purpose of influencing a wide range of corpo-
rate behavior .... "); Weiss, Disclosure and Corporate Accountability, 34 Bus. LAW. 575
(1979) ("one of the central themes of the system by which large corporations are gov-
erned [is] that corporate decision-making be regulated through mandatory disclosure
requirements rather than direct government intervention").
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disclosure and merit regulation in state regulatory systems demon-
strates this point even more clearly.
Disclosure regulation is used in connection with a merit review
in at least three different ways. First, the administrator may require
structuring or restructuring of the terms of the offerings or associ-
ated transactions to ensure compliance with a specific merit stan-
dard, and then mandate specific explanation in the prospectus of the
steps taken to bring the offering into compliance. Compliance with
merit regulation, thus, may generate material information that will
have to be disclosed.93 Second, an administrator may waive compli-
ance with either a specific or a general merit standard on the condi-
tion that full disclosure of the facts and circumstances constituting
the noncompliance is provided. In other words, the result of the
negotiations between the administrator and counsel may be a disclo-
sure solution to a merit problem.94 Third, a state administrator may
simply engage in a full-scale disclosure review, with or without par-
ticular reference to merit concerns, resulting in disclosure require-
ments additional to SEC requirements.9 5
Each of these three varieties of state disclosure regulation will
receive more detailed consideration in Part III. Let it suffice to say
for now, however, that the state administrators' use of these tech-
niques shows that in state securities regulation, merit and disclosure
reviews are used together in a highly complementary fashion.
III. THE VARIETIES OF STATE DISCLOSURE REGULATION
A. Disclosure of Material Information Generated by Merit Compliance
The most traditional, and perhaps least controversial, state dis-
closure obligations are those generated by compliance with merit
requirements. In essence, the substantive structuring or restructur-
ing of economic relationships in response to merit standards may
create material information that needs to be disclosed. Examples in
point are the disclosures incident to compliance with cheap stock
restrictions.
The existence of cheap stock and the promoters' commitment
to place all or some of their stock in escrow subject to "earn out" or
other requirements ordinarily will be regarded as items of material
information. It will usually be disclosed by including in the prospec-
tus an undertaking or warranty expressing the promoters' agree-
93. See infra text accompanying notes 96-111.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 112-124.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 125-134.
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ment to the escrow arrangement and describing the arrangement.
This document thus serves as both a legally binding commitment
and a disclosure of that commitment. Furthermore, some additional
discussion will be required in the narrative portions of the prospec-
tus when there are substantial amounts of cheap stock, or when the
administrator has some concern about the escrow arrangement.9 6
Another example of the relationship between disclosure and
merit requirements can be found in the treatment of the so-called
"democracy" provisions of the Statements of Policy (or "guide-
lines") promulgated by the North American Securities Administra-
tors Association (NASAA) for real estate, oil and gas, and
equipment programs.9 7 The guidelines are detailed sets of stan-
dards and requirements adopted by NASAA and implemented by
some of its members either formally as state rules or on an informal
basis.98 Most of the standards and requirements are "merit" in
character, in the sense that they expressly prohibit or limit specified
types of economic relationships, with the main goal of controlling
the many ways in which the program promoter or sponsor can
hedge or eliminate its risk while leaving the public investor subject
96. For example, a risk-factor or "certain factors" section of the prospectus might
include language to this effect:
Mr. [CEO] also has agreed to escrow a total of 1,000,000 shares of Common
Stock of [Issuer] representing 50% of the ownership in [Issuer]. Such shares
are subject to release only if the market price of the Common Stock reaches
and maintains certain minimum levels in the future or if [Issuer] achieves cer-
tain levels of cumulative pretax earnings. Any shares not released will revert
back to [Issuer].
97. NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs § VII, NASAA Reports
(CCH) 3607 (Nov. 20, 1986); NASAA Statement of Policy, Registration of Oil and Gas
Programs § VIII, NASAA Reports (CCH) 2608 (July 1, 1984); NASAA Statement of
Policy, Equipment Programs § VI, NASAA Reports (CCH) 1606 (Nov. 20, 1986).
NASAA is an organization comprised of securities regulators from sixty-five juris-
dictions located in the United States, Puerto Rico, Canada, and Mexico. NASAA is not
itself a regulatory entity. NASAA Reports (CCH) 1 (1986).
98. For surveys of the state-to-state implementation of the real estate and oil and gas
guidelines, see Subcommittee on Real Estate Programs, ABA State Regulation of Securi-
ties Committee, Survey on State Implementation and Application of the Current
NASAA Real Estate Guidelines (Apr. 1, 1986); Subcommittee on Oil and Gas Programs,
ABA State Regulation of Securities Committee, Survey on State Implementation and
Application of the NASAA Statement of Policy for Registration of Oil and Gas Programs
(Apr. 1, 1986). For discussion of the three sets of guidelines, see Gruber, Johnson &
Walker, The Equipment Guidelines and Proposed Amendments, 41 Bus. LAw. 1545 (1986);
Lanctot & Harris, Recent Developments in State Regulation of Public Real Estate Securities Offer-
ings, 41 Bus. LAw. 1533 (1986); Strahota, Oil & Gas Program Offerings, 17 REV. SEC. REG.
811 (1984).
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to the risks of the enterprise.99 The guidelines thus include compre-
hensive limitations on promoter compensation,100 affiliate transac-
tions,' 01 "promotional interests," 102 and a wide variety of other
practices. They also contain requirements, such as the democracy
provisions, that attack more indirectly the sponsor's perceived ten-
dency toward opportunistic behavior.
The democracy provisions are intended to give the participants
a voice in the governance of the program. Accordingly, they require
that each participant be granted access to the list of participants and
to the program's books and records,' and that participants hold-
ing more than ten percent of the outstanding interests be allowed to
call meetings of the program. 10 4 The participants also must have
the authority to amend the limited partnership agreement (if the
program is a limited partnership), dissolve the program, replace the
sponsor, and approve the sale of all or substantially all of the pro-
gram's assets.' 0 5 Programs that wish to qualify their securities offer-
ings in jurisdictions applying the NASAA guidelines thus must
provide their participants at least these governance rights, none of
which are mandated by federal law.
The program prospectus must disclose the adjustments in their
governance structure made in response to these state merit require-
ments. This disclosure is made primarily in the limited partnership
agreement, the document that gives legal effect to these arrange-
ments. Some discussion of the participant's governance rights, fur-
thermore, ordinarily will be found in the narrative section of the
prospectus. Substantive compliance with the democracy provisions
of the NASAA guidelines, like compliance with state cheap stock re-
99. See Report on State Merit Regulation, supra note 2, at 825; Makens, supra note 33, at
444-45.
100. E.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, Registration of Oil and Gas Programs § V,
NASAA Reports (CCH) 2605 (July 1, 1984) ("Fees, compensation and expenses")
101. E.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, Equipment Programs § V, NASAA Reports
(CCH) 1605 (Nov. 20, 1986) ("Conflicts of interest and investment restrictions").
102. E.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs § IV.E, NASAA Reports
(CCH) 3604 (Nov. 20, 1986). A "promotional interest" is an equity interest in the
program received by the sponsor in consideration for its promotional services. The
Statement of Policy permits such an interest provided that the amount or percentage of
the interest is "reasonable," and sets out a complex formula for determining when the
interest is "presumptively reasonable." Id.
103. E.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, Registration of Oil and Gas Programs
§ VIII.C, NASAA Reports (CCH) 2608 (July 1, 1984).
104. E.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs § VII.A, NASAA Reports
(CCH) $ 3607 (Nov. 20, 1986).
105. E.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, Equipment Programs § VI.B, NASAA Reports
(CCH) 1606 (Nov. 20, 1986).
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strictions, thus is a means of generating material information that
must be fully disclosed.
A final example of the affirmative obligation to disclose material
information generated by merit compliance can be found in a Min-
nesota regulation governing insider loans."0 6 This regulation be-
gins in a pure disclosure mode by requiring detailed disclosure in
the prospectus of all loans by the issuer to officers, directors, em-
ployees, and principal shareholders outstanding as of one year prior
to the application for registration.'0 7 The regulation then imposes a
substantive requirement: the issuer must agree that all such loans
will be repaid within one year from the date of registration.' 0 8 That
substantive requirement, however, is coupled with a disclosure re-
quirement, since the commitment to repay the loan must be dis-
closed in the prospectus. 0 9 Finally, the regulation concludes with a
requirement for disclosure of a substantive undertaking, by mandat-
ing that the prospectus contain language to the effect that:
[t]he company has agreed with certain state regulatory au-
thorities that so long as the company's securities are regis-
tered in such states, or one year from the date of this
(prospectus) . . . whichever is longer, the company will not
make loans to its officers, directors, employees or principal
shareholders, except for loans made in the ordinary course
of business .... 't0
The Minnesota regulation, therefore, demands that the issuer un-
dertake not to make loans to insiders for at least a year, and then
mandates specific disclosure of that information-information the
administrator has, by rule, deemed material. 1 1
The affirmative disclosure obligations created by the alteration
of economic relationships in response to merit standards are neither
new nor particularly controversial. They are an inevitable by-prod-
uct of a system that requires both disclosure of all material informa-
tion and compliance with substantive standards of fairness. They
demonstrate, in a relatively simple way, the interdependent relation-
ship of the two regulatory techniques. A more complex aspect of
106. MINN. R. 2875.3060, reprinted in IA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 33,499 (June
1984).
107. Id. Subpart 1.
108. Id. Subpart 2.
109. Id.
110. Id. Subpart 3.
111. For a similar mixture of merit and disclosure techniques in the regulation of
insider loans, see Ohio Commissioner of Securities, Insider Loans Policy, 2 Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) 45,709 (May 1986).
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that relationship, however, is reflected in the development of disclo-
sure solutions to merit problems.
B. Disclosure Solutions to Merit Problems
In some instances, a state administrator may have specific merit
concerns with the fairness of an offering, but will choose to address
the problem through specific disclosure rather than requiring altera-
tion of the substantive terms of the offering or associated transac-
tions. This can be described as a disclosure solution to a merit
problem, because the state's objection to a particular aspect of the
offering flows from its preoccupation with fairness to the investor,
but resolution of the problem is achieved through specifically man-
dated disclosure rather than through mandatory restructuring of the
offer, the issuer, or associated transactions. Cases in which this oc-
curs are thus distinguishable from those described in the previous
section, when both compliance with some substantive standard and
disclosure of that fact are required. The line between "merit" and
"disclosure" is less distinct in these cases, as a recent policy state-
ment by the Ohio Commissioner of Securities on "blank check" pre-
ferred stock shows.' 12
This policy statement defines the status under Ohio securities
law of that popular form of shark repellent:
A proposed public offering of securities to be made by an
issuer which has or proposes to have preferred stock issued
or issuable with rights, preferences, and privileges to be
determined by the Board of Directors without further ac-
tion by stockholders is presumed to be grossly unfair un-
less the final offering circular prominently discloses within
the description of such preferred stock that "the Board of
Directors without shareholder approval can issue preferred
stock with voting and conversion rights which could ad-
versely affect the voting power of the common
shareholders."" 13
The blending of merit and disclosure concepts in this policy state-
ment is remarkably explicit. The policy statement's reference to the
"grossly unfair" character of blank-check preferred stock reflects
this merit jurisdiction's traditional concern with substantive fair-
ness,l 4 but the statement does not require redemption of the stock
112. Ohio Commissioner of Securities, Blank-check preferred policy, 2 Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) 45,708 (May 1986).
113. Id. at 40,603.
114. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.13 (Anderson 1985) (stating fairness standard
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as a condition of registration, as might be expected. It merely pro-
vides that the offering will be deemed "grossly unfair" unless the
disclosure document clearly explains what the board may do with
such stock. In essence, the Ohio Commissioner stopped short of
applying the full weight of his merit authority, which would have
permitted denial of registration to the offering, and remained con-
tent with requiring specific disclosure of the magnifying impact of
the "blank check" preferred stock on the board's authority." i 5 In
short, the policy statement propounds a disclosure solution to a
merit problem.
This approach to blank-check preferred stock and other forms
of shark repellent has become popular in other jurisdictions, which
tend to apply an Ohio-type disclosure requirement, even without
adoption of an express rule or policy statement." 6 The reliance on
a disclosure solution to this particular merit problem perhaps dem-
onstrates an understandable, and highly politic, reluctance on the
part of some states to challenge directly the- broad movement
among public issuers toward the adoption of this and other types of
shark repellents.' 1 7 Any attempt to influence these sensitive areas
of corporate governance and control through the imposition of
merit requirements would at least generate significant controversy,
if not political or legal challenge, as the fate of the first-generation
state takeover statutes shows." 8 States using the Ohio approach to
shark repellents, therefore, are attempting to vindicate their merit
for suspension or revocation of securities registration). See also Commissioner's Letter,
OHIO SEC. BULL., Oct. 1986, at 2, 3 (describing the Division of Securities' concern with
risky offerings).
115. The Ohio Commissioner of Securities has adopted a similar statement of policy
with respect to public offerings by issuers with classes of stock possessing unequal vot-
ing rights, another common form of shark repellent. Ohio Commissioner of Securities,
Subordinate voting rights policy, 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 45,707 (May 1986).
116. It is not necessary to identify the individual states that tend to apply this require-
ment. As of this writing, it is fair to say that most active merit jurisdictions will at least
comment on the issue. They may differ, however, in the type of disclosure they will
require with respect to the preferred stock. Some may require a simple statement to the
effect that "the issuance of such stock may adversely affect the rights of the common
shareholders." Others may require a more detailed explanation of the effect.
117. For analysis of the practical and policy implications of the various forms of shark
repellent, see Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection Against Two-Tier and Partial Tender Offers:
The Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bid, and Flip-Over Provisions under Delaware Law, 11 SEC.
REG. L.J. 291 (1984); Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limita-
tions on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775 (1982); Note, Protecting Shareholders
Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964
(1984).
118. For a discussion of the devastating impact of constitutional challenges on the
first-generation state takeover statutes, see authorities cited supra note 15.
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concerns, to the greatest extent possible, by imposing specific dis-
closure requirements.
The use of disclosure solutions to merit problems is not con-
fined to the highly political and sensitive area of corporate govern-
ance and shark repellents. Disclosure solutions are often used in
the ordinary negotiations among administrators and counsel over
more mundane aspects of corporate initial public offerings and lim-
ited partnership programs. These negotiations are a process of
give-and-take, and as part of that process, the administrator may
choose to waive strict compliance with some specific merit standard
on the condition that specific disclosure of the facts associated with
the merit problem is made. Insider loans are a case in point. The
administrator may have the authority, as under the Minnesota regu-
lations described above," 9 to require repayment of the outstanding
loans as a condition of registration. If the administrator can be per-
suaded, however, that the terms of the loans were reasonable, that
their repayment would cause undue hardship, or that their effect on
the issuer's financial position is not substantial, the administrator
may forebear from demanding repayment, and may be satisfied by
detailed disclosure of the loan.
Disclosure solutions of this kind are particularly important
under the NASAA guidelines for limited partnership programs,
which contain very specific limitations, usually expressed in quanti-
tative terms, on many different aspects of the transactions.' 20 The
real estate guidelines, for example, set out a complex formula for
determining the precise percentage of capital contributions that
must be invested in properties rather than paid to the sponsor as
front-end fees.' 2 ' Similarly, there are specific quantitative limita-
tions on the promotional interests that may be allowed to the spon-
sor and on property management and other fees that may be paid to
the sponsor or its affiliates.' 22 Administrators tend to enforce these
limitations strictly, but they can sometimes be persuaded to waive
strict compliance if they are satisfied that the terms of the offering,
in the aggregate, are fair and if the issuer will disclose its noncom-
pliance with the guideline's specific limitations.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 106-11.
120. See supra notes 100-102.
121. NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs § IV.C, NASAA Reports
(CCH) 3604 (Dec. 1986). For discussion of the regulatory premises of the compensa-
tion sections of the real estate guidelines, see Makens, supra note 33, at 443-47.
122. NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs §§ IV.D-I, NASAA Reports
(CCH) 3604 (Dec. 1986).
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It is virtually impossible to determine how frequently blue sky
negotiations produce this result, or whether reliance on such disclo-
sure solutions is increasing. It is probably fair to say, however, that
the political and philosophical difficulties of dealing with the recent
proliferation of shark repellents have caused at least some states to
rely more heavily on disclosure as a means of addressing their merit
concerns with governance issues. It is also possible that the threat
of political assaults on merit regulation, such as those in Iowa, Illi-
nois, Louisiana, and Texas, 23 has led some administrators to search
for practical solutions that fall short of merit regulation in its full
rigor and glory.' 24
In any event, the use of disclosure solutions to merit problems
is perhaps the best illustration of the non-antithetical relationship of
merit and disclosure regulation. It should also be recognized, how-
ever, that state administrators also engage in disclosure regulation
for its own sake, without particular reference to merit concerns.
C. Disclosure for Disclosure's Sake
While merit regulation has long been state securities regula-
tion's most distinctive characteristic, it has also long had a disclo-
sure component. State administrators possess the statutory
authority to deny effectiveness to a registration statement if it con-
tains omissions or misrepresentations of material fact, 1 25 and many
state laws require the delivery of a prospectus to all purchasers
within the state.'1 6 The state administrators are particularly con-
cerned with the level of disclosure in state-registered offerings not
registered with the SEC. They often impose detailed disclosure re-
quirements on such offerings, as is demonstrated by the many pages
of detailed requirements for non-SEC-registered offerings con-
tained in the NASAA oil and gas guidelines.127 With respect to
SEC-registered offerings, state administrators will to some extent be
satisfied by the issuer's compliance with SEC disclosure require-
123. For discussion of these political developments, see Sargent, Challenge, supra note
2.
124. For discussion of some other examples of such solutions, see Report on State Mlerit
Regulation, supra note 2, at 801-04.
125. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(2)(A).
126. See, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 510-50.27(502), reprinted in IA Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) 25,427 (Aug. 1983); MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-502(c), -504(d)
(1985); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § SEC 3.23, reprinted in 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 64,543
(Dec. 1985).
127. NASAA Statement of Policy, Registration of Oil and Gas Programs § X.C,
NASAA Reports (CCH) 2610 (July 1, 1984).
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ments, but they are fully prepared to conduct an independent dis-
closure review.
The NASAA real estate guidelines, for example, provide that
"[t]he prospectus shall meet the requirements of Guide 5... of the
Securities and Exchange Commission,"' 28 which prescribes the con-
tents of the prospectus to be used in connection with federal regis-
tration of real estate limited partnership programs. 129  The
guidelines go on to state, however, that "[t]he administrator may
require additional disclosure if, in the administrator's opinion, spe-
cific facts concerning the offering require it." 130
The real estate guidelines also impose specific requirements for
the disclosure of forecasts.13 The guideline provisions relating to
forecasts prohibit their use in connection with nonspecified prop-
erty or "blind pool" programs, define categories of "material infor-
mation" required to be included in the forecast, and prescribe the
method of presentation. 3 2 In short, the real estate guidelines, as
well as those developed for other types of programs, 3 3 are exam-
ples of an indigenous state tradition of disclosure regulation.
This regulatory tradition is not unique to limited partnership
program offerings. Some states will engage in an independent dis-
closure review of corporate equity offerings and will provide a full
set of disclosure comments. These comments can range over a
broad variety of issues, from those with direct merit implications
such as insider loans or cheap stock, to matters such as the status of
pending litigation, the use of proceeds, the potential impact of reor-
ganization in Delaware, or the qualifications of management. Pursu-
ant to this disclosure review, the administrators may require
disclosures additional to or different from those required by the
SEC. They may, in particular, require more extensive disclosure
and highlighting of risk factors for the benefit of the "average" in-
vestor. The administrator may, for example, require language stat-
ing simply that "these are speculative securities." The key
characteristic of this form of disclosure regulation, however, is that
128. NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs § VIIIB, NASAA Reports
(CCH) 3608 at 2032 (Nov. 20, 1986).
129. SEC Guide 5, Preparation of Registration Statements Relating to Interests In
Real Estate Limited Partnerships, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3829 (Sept. 1982).
130. NASAA Statement of Policy, Real Estate Programs § VIII.B, NASAA Reports
(CCH) 3608 (Nov. 20, 1986).
131. Id. § VIII.C.
132. Id. at 2033.
133. See NASAA Statement of Policy, Equipment Programs § VII.B, NASAA Reports
(CCH) 1607 (Nov. 20, 1986).
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the administrators are pursuing disclosure for disclosure's sake, and
not purely in connection with the pursuit of their specific, traditional
merit concerns.
As will be explained below, compliance with multistate disclo-
sure reviews can be difficult and costly, especially if the net result is
amendment of the prospectus or the preparation of several single-
state supplements (usually in the form of special inserts or "stick-
ers"). The states' interest in this type of "pure" disclosure regula-
tion, furthermore, seems to be growing, perhaps in response to the
administrators' perception that the SEC is devoting fewer resources
to the review of registration statements. 134
Be that as it may, it is fair to say that state disclosure regulation
in general has become an important aspect of state securities regula-
tion. It has also become a complex phenomenon, since the lines of
distinction among the three varieties of state disclosure regulation
can sometimes waver, and all three varieties are used simultaneously
in connection with most offerings. For example, a state review of a
corporate initial public offering may lead to: (i) a mandatory cheap-
stock escrow arrangement that will have to be explained in the pro-
spectus (disclosure of material information generated by merit com-
pliance); (ii) a decision by the administrator to allow questionable
loans to the chief executive officer to remain outstanding, provided
that a detailed discussion of the loan is contained in the prospectus
(a disclosure solution to a merit problem); and (iii) revision of the
prospectus to set forth a more comprehensive discussion of risk fac-
tors (disclosure for disclosure's sake). The results of this review,
therefore, reflect the impact of a multileveled system of disclosure
regulation rendered more complex by its interaction with both state
merit concerns and federal disclosure requirements. It is from the
perspective of this interaction that the state system of disclosure
regulation should be evaluated.
IV. A CRITICAL EVALUATION
State securities regulation, in general, has always been contro-
versial. It has been challenged in the courts on constitutional
134. See, e.g., Commissioner's Letter, OHIO SEC. BULL., Oct. 1986, at 2 ("Popular con-
ception has it that the SEC is a powerful and dynamic watchdog of the securities markets
and guardian of the public interest; however, in 1985 the SEC reviewed only 60% of first
time offerings and only 25% of repeat offerings."); D. Bell, Remarks at 1986 Annual
Meeting of NASAA 12 (unpublished transcript on file with the aiyland Law Review)
("Further[,] the diminishing SEC role is adding more incentive for expanding state
regulation.").
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grounds, 3 5 attacked in the state legislatures, 3 6 and vehemently
criticized in the academic literature. 3 7 Most of the controversy has
centered around merit regulation, for obvious reasons. The vast
amount of discretion lodged in the merit administrator, the inherent
subjectivity of the "fair, just, and equitable" standard, the elusive
quality of specific merit standards, the disproportionate influence of
individual state requirements on national public offerings, and the
highly paternalistic character of the regulatory technique have all
helped generate confusion, frustration, and resentment. 3 8 State
disclosure regulation per se has never generated that kind of emo-
tional response, or anything like the amount of controversy.
There is no mystery in this difference. To a large extent the
failure to distinguish state disclosure regulation from merit regula-
tion for purposes of criticism reflects the peculiar character of state
securities regulation-a complex, functional intertwining of merit
and disclosure techniques in a single regulatory system. Criticism of
"merit regulation," therefore, should also be regarded as criticism
of the disclosure component of that regulatory system. The failure
also reflects the basic fact that the imposition of affirmative disclo-
sure obligations is usually less obtrusive than the imposition of sub-
stantive requirements on the offering. These explanations,
however, should not obscure the need for critical evaluation of state
disclosure regulation. State disclosure regulation is problematic
from both practical and policy perspectives, and it is likely to be-
come more problematic as the state administrators' interest in this
form of regulation grows.
A. The Practical Problem
The practical problem with state disclosure regulation is a con-
sequence of the stresses inherent in an overlapping state-federal
regulatory system. In a national or multistate public offering there
is invariably a single prospectus, drafted largely if not entirely in
135. For discussion of the constitutional status of state securities regulation, see War-
ren, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C.L. REV.
495, 501-14 (1984).
136. See generally Sargent, Challenge, supra note 2.
137. See Bateman, State Securities Registration: An Unresolved Dilemma and a Suggestion for
the Federal Securities Code, 27 Sw. L.J. 759 (1973); Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the
Theory of Overkill, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1447 (1969); Campbell, An Open Attack on the Nonsense
of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553 (1985); Mofsky & Tollison, Demerit in Merit
Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 367 (1977).
138. For analysis of these issues, see Report on State Merit Regulation, supra note 2, at
832-45.
1987] 1057
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
accordance with the SEC's specific disclosure rules and with a vivid
awareness of potential liability under section 11 of the 1933 Act. 139
Drafting the prospectus is ordinarily a team effort, requiring signifi-
cant contributions from issuer's and underwriter's counsel, account-
ants and other experts, and issuer management, all of whom
approach the task with a desire to establish their own due diligence,
while producing a document that will survive an SEC review.1 40 The
result is a document that has been thoroughly negotiated after many
weeks of effort and that reflects the parties' considered judgment of
which information is material and which is not.
Submission of this document to the SEC, of course, usually re-
sults in some revision and amendment, at least in the case of initial
public offerings. This can create delays and additional expense, but
the process has been institutionalized through a letter of comment
process in which problems are resolved through negotiation.' 4 1 Re-
vision of the prospectus to reflect the concerns expressed in the sin-
gle federal review process thus is workable so long as the process is
administered on the basis of nonarbitrary standards and require-
ments. Difficulties arise, however, when that single document is
subjected to multiple disclosure reviews in several jurisdictions. By
their very nature, multiple disclosure reviews can make the registra-
tion process more difficult and expensive.
In order to satisfy the differing requirements of several state
examiners, this carefully balanced disclosure document may have to
be partially rewritten or festooned with single-state "stickers," each
setting out the different language required to be delivered to inves-
tors in individual states. In some cases, furthermore, the disclosures
required by an individual state may be regarded as so burdensome
139. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
140. For practitioners' discussions of the roles of the different participants in the com-
plex process of drafting an SEC registration statement, see Sonsini, Preparing the Registra-
tion Statement, in 1 SECURITIES LAw TECHNIQUES § 19.01 (A. Sommer, Jr. ed. 1987);
Schneider, Manko & Kant, Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and Consequences, 27 VILL. L.
REV. 1 (1981); Wheat & Blackstone, Guideposts for a First Public Offering, 15 Bus. LAw. 539
(1960). For discussion of the concept of "due diligence" as a defense to § I 1 liability
and its practical implications for the drafting of registration statements, see H. BLOO-
MENTHAL, C. HARVEY & S. WING, 1986 GOING PUBLIC HANDBOOK, GOING PUBLIC, THE
INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE SYSTEM AND EXEMPT FINANCING 7-1 to -24; L. LOSS, FUNDAMEN-
TALS, supra note 30, at 1029-46 (1983); M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 323-4 10
(1986); SODERQUIST, Due Diligence Examinations, PRAC. LAw., March 1, 1978, at 33.
141. For a set of materials exemplifying the SEC examiner's comments on a registra-
tion statement, together with letters of response to those comments, see VENTURE CAPI-
TAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION (M. Halloran ed. 1984). For discussion of the
SEC negotiation process, see Rowe, The Process of Becoming "Effective," in 2 SECURI-
TIES LAW TECHNIQUES § 22.01 to -. 11 (A. Sommer, Jr. ed. 1987).
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that the application for registration will be voluntarily withdrawn,
with the result that the underwriter will not offer the securities in
that state.
These problems cannot be described as deal-killers. 142 There is
no evidence that enforcement of state affirmative disclosure obliga-
tions causes entire national offerings to collapse, even though they
may cause offerings to be withdrawn from individual states. Fur-
thermore, the tinkering with the language of the prospectus proba-
bly will not produce additional exposure to section 11 liability, so
long as counsel is careful to fit the state-mandated disclosures into
the overall context of the document. 143 What state disclosure regu-
lation does produce, however, is additional compliance costs, usu-
ally in the form of legal fees, printing fees, and, in serious cases,
costs of delay.' 44 In a more fundamental sense, the necessity to
comply with state disclosure requirements generates opportunity
costs for all of those involved in the process, including counsel, is-
suer management, accountants, and others, whose time and re-
sources could be used more productively. Of course, the costs
associated with compliance with state disclosure requirements can-
not really be disentangled from those incurred in connection with a
merit review, but state disclosure regulation can nevertheless be de-
scribed as a complicating and cost-generating factor. If state disclo-
sure regulation can fairly be described as a cost-generator, it must
be asked whether the imposition of these costs on the capital forma-
tion process is justifiable as a matter of policy.
142. For statement of a practitioner's opinion to the effect that state disclosure re-
quirements are usually workable and that actual conflict with SEC requirements is rare,
see Bartell, supra note 5, at § 24.04. Other practitioners report far more difficulty with
state disclosure compliance.
143. Some practitioners, however, hesitate to comply with state requests for single-
state stickers or supplements, on the theory that an inadvertent and all-too-possible fail-
ure to deliver a stickered prospectus to every resident investor constitutes a failure to
meet the state prospectus delivery requirement, thereby creating potential liability for a
registration violation.
144. There is much debate over the amount and significance of the costs generated by
compliance with state requirements in general and merit requirements in particular.
Compare Tyler, supra note 74, at 931-34 with Campbell, supra note 137, at 577-79. While
these costs are difficult to quantify, the aggregate cost of filing fees, additional printing
expenses, attorneys' and underwriters' fees, and the expenses generated by delays inci-
dent to state compliance cannot be regarded as trivial, especially when combined with
the opportunity costs incurred by the many people involved in the blue sky registration
process. These costs, furthermore, must be combined with the costs of maintaining the
state securities agencies themselves.
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B. State Disclosure Regulation as a Problem in the Allocation of
Regulatory Responsibilities
More specifically, it must be asked whether state disclosure reg-
ulation plays a positive role in the allocation of regulatory responsi-
bilities between the states and the SEC. This question is difficult to
answer, largely because it has to be answered in the context of the
more fundamental question of whether the SEC's mandatory disclo-
sure system is in any sense justifiable or desirable. The debate over
this question is long-standing and heated, and its basic terms are
currently undergoing revision.
Professor John Coffee has argued that academic discussion of
the SEC's disclosure-based system has had three distinct phases.1 45
The first, or "motherhood," phase placed the SEC virtually beyond
criticism: "to criticize the SEC was tantamount to favoring
fraud.' 46  In the second phase, a group of revisionists used both
empirical analysis and economic theory to argue that the federal
mandatory disclosure system produced few benefits and substantial
Costs. 14 7 The revisionists' claims were sharply criticized by com-
145. Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatoy Disclosure System, 70 VA.
L. REV. 717 (1984).
146. Id. at 717.
147. Id. The first major revisionists were Professors Stigler, Benston, and Manne.
Professor Stigler used empirical analysis to argue that corporate disclosures compelled
by the SEC's mandatory disclosure system were unnecessary. Stigler, Public Regulation of
the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. L. 117 (1964). Benston used a more comprehensive
quantitative study to assert that there was little evidence of fraud in corporate financial
statements before 1933 and that corporate voluntary disclosures prior to that date pro-
vided investors with sufficient material information for sound investment decisions. See,
e.g., The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44 ACcT. REV. 515 (1969); The
Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY
AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23 (H. Manne ed. 1969); Required Disclo-
sure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON.
REV. 132 (1973); Required Periodic Disclosure Under the Securities Acts and the Proposed Federal
Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1471 (1979); The Costs and Benefits of Government Re-
quired Disclosure, in CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: GOVERNANCE AND REFORM (D.
DeMott ed. 1980). For an excellent summary and critique of Professors Stigler's and
Benston's arguments, see Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure
System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 10-45 (1983) [hereinafter Seligman, Historical Need].
Professor Manne's critique of the SEC's mandatory disclosure system focused on
the federal prohibitions against insider trading, arguing that insider trading can be a
means of aligning the interests of corporate managers and public shareholders. See H.
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); H. MANNE & E. SOLOMON,
WALL STREET IN TRANSITION: THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY
(1974).
Other revisionists have relied on agency theory and the theory of the firm to argue
that a mandatory corporate disclosure system is not needed because corporate managers
possess sufficient incentives to disclose voluntarily all or virtually all material informa-
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mentators who questioned their underlying assumptions, their em-
pirical methodology, and most importantly, their findings with
respect to historical levels of fraud."' 8 This debate between the
revisionists and their opponents focused primarily on the traditional
formulations of the goals of the SEC's mandatory disclosure system:
protection of the individual investor, control of fraud, and promo-
tion of investor confidence in the securities markets."' 9 In the third,
emerging phase of the debate, a "post-revisionist" position is begin-
ning to crystallize, in which the SEC's mandatory disclosure system
is defended and the revisionists are taken to task for their overstated
claims, but with the defense relying upon novel arguments drawn
from the type of economic analysis used more critically by the
revisionists. ' 50
tion to investors. H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979);Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Ross, The Economics of
Information and the Disclosure Regulation Debate, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION (F. Ed-
wards ed. 1979).
148. Among the major academic critiques of Professor Stigler's work are Friend &
Herman, Professor Stigler on Securities Regulation: A Further Comment, 38 J. Bus. L. 106
(1965); Friend & Herman, The SEC Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. L. 382 (1964);
Friend & Westerfeld, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 467
(1975). See also Professor Seligman's thorough refutation of Professor Benston's claims.
Seligman, Historical Need, supra note 147, at 18-45. He argues compellingly against the
revisionist position on the basis of new research into historical levels of securities fraud
prior to the enactment of federal securities legislation.
Professor Manne's arguments against the prohibition on insider trading have been
criticized by those who share many of his assumptions about the economics of securities
regulation. See Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Pro-
duction of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309; Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the
Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982); Levmore, Securities and
Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117 (1982).
The SEC responded negatively to the revisionists' claims after an intensive review
of its disclosure policies by a special advisory committee. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTER-
STATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COM-
MITEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Comm. Print 1977).
149. Consider the series of arguments put forward in Professor Seligman's summary
and critique of the revisionist arguments. Seligman, Historical Need, supra note 147, at
10-45.
150. The two principal statements of the emerging post-revisionist position are Cof-
fee, supra note 145, and Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984). These authors disagree over some major points, but
they share reliance on the efficient capital market theory, skepticism over the value of
quantitative studies, and at least some belief in the value of a mandatory disclosure sys-
tem in contemporary market structures. Coffee, supra note 145, at 719-20; Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra, at 696-707, 709-13. The crux of their common position is a belief that
private incentives for the production of information are inadequate. Coffee, supra note
145, at 737-47; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra, at 685-87. For a discussion of their differ-
ences, see Coffee, supra note 145, at 720-22.
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It is too early to identify a canonical version of the post-revi-
sionist position, but its crux seems to be a preoccupation with the
effects of a mandatory disclosure system on the efficiency of the
market, 5 ' rather than the traditional considerations of investor pro-
tection, fraud deterrence, and investor confidence. 52 In the post-
revisionist view, a mandatory disclosure system makes sense if it im-
proves the allocative efficiency of the capital market by generating
greater amounts of and more accurate information, thereby reduc-
ing the cost of information search,' 53 facilitating investment on a
portfolio basis,' 54 and reinforcing the disciplinary effect of the mar-
ket on corporate managers. 55 From this perspective, furthermore,
a mandatory disclosure system should function not to facilitate indi-
vidual investor review of issuer disclosures, but rather to help secur-
ities intermediaries perform more efficiently.' 56
These arguments use as their central organizing principle the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis,' 57 but reflect serious reserva-
tions about the extent to which the hypothesis can be used to justify
151. See infra note 157.
152. Easterbrook and Fischel specifically repudiate the traditional arguments in favor
of a mandatory disclosure system. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 150, at 692-96.
Coffee is also critical of these arguments, but chooses to emphasize the positive alterna-
tive of an efficiency-based justification for a mandatory disclosure system. Coffee, supra
note 145, at 722-37, 751-53.
153. Coffee, supra note 145, at 723-37. Professors Gordon and Kornhauser have de-
fined allocative efficiency in the capital markets in the following terms:
[C]apital markets provide and allocate investment funds. Investment funds are
used to produce "new capital," production facilities that will provide goods and
services to be consumed in future periods .... To make a "good" investment
decision, the investor must know how much value the new capital will produce
in the future. That is, she must know the real returns of the (real) investment-
namely, gross revenues less costs of production. We shall call a capital market
that induces . . . "good" (real) investment decisions, "allocatively efficient."
Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information,and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 761, 767 (1985) (emphasis in original).
154. Coffee, supra note 145, at 747-51.
155. Id. at 722, 738-43.
156. Id. at 725-34.
157. As Professors Gilson and Kraakman have pointed out, the Efficient Capital Mar-
ket Hypothesis "is now the context in which serious discussion of the regulation of fi-
nancial markets takes place." Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanism of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1984). The classic definition of market efficiency is that "prices at
any time 'fully reflect' all available information." Fama, Efficient Capital larkets: A Review
of Theory and Empirical Work, 25J. FIN. 383 (1970). For a discussion of the complex theo-
retical questions associated with the application of this definition to securities markets,
see Gilson & Kraakman, supra, at 554-65. These writers attempt to develop a cogent
theoretical account of the processes by which information is reflected in securities'
prices. Id. at 552-54, 642-43. For a generally positive evaluation of their conclusions,
see Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 VA. L. REV. 645 (1984).
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deregulation. 58 There seems to be a common belief that some kind
of mandatory disclosure system is desirable and that wholesale de-
regulation is unnecessary. 59 This belief is tempered by a recogni-
tion that the SEC's existing rules are by no means optimal and that
some reform is needed. The nature of the post-revisionist reform
program, however, is not clear.
158. For sharp criticism of unqualified reliance on the Efficient Capital Market Hy-
pothesis as a basis for deregulation and other changes in legal policy, see Coffee, supra
note 145, at 719 n.10 ("distinctions should be drawn in terms of the degree to which the
ECMH is used as a justification for deregulation-particularly since very little evidence
exists with respect to any market other than the New York Stock Exchange."); Gordon &
Kornhauser, supra note 153, at 796-837 ("In our world, which may be only 'close' to the
best of all possible worlds, the insights provided by theories of financial markets require
patient cultivation before legal policy flowers."); Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock
Market is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 394-402 (1986) ("Many legal commen-
tators have assumed that the stock market is efficient. These commentators should rec-
ognize that the validity of this hypothesis is questionable.").
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis has been used as a basis for criticism and
reformulation of legal policy in several areas. For example, it furnishes a key premise
for the fraud on the market theory, under which the necessity to demonstrate reliance in
rule lOb-5 actions (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986)) is eliminated. See Black, Fraud on the
Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transac-
tions, 62 N.C.L. REV. 435, 437-38 (1984); Pickholz & Horahan, The SEC's Version of the
Efficient Market Theory and Its Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
943, 956 (1982); Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory: Efficient Markets and the Defenses to an
Implied Rule lOb-5 Action, 70 IowA L. REv. 975, 975-93 (1985). It also has been used as an
element in the definition of materiality. See Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital
Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 381-86 (1984).
Similarly, the hypothesis has played a role in critiques of the federal prohibition on in-
sider trading. See Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule lOb-5, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 1307, 1330-42 (1981); Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: Fairness versus Eco-
nomic Theory, 37 Bus. LAw. 517, 520-26 (1982); Lorie, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5, Disclo-
sure, and Corporate Privacy: A Comment, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 819, 821-22 (1980). It has also
been a principal element of the debate over whether the stock market exception to the
appraisal remedy results in gross undervaluation of the shares. See J. SELIGMAN, THE
SEC AND THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 312-15 (1985); Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate
Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875, 884-85. The hypothesis' most dramatic impact,
however, has been in the development of the SEC's integrated disclosure and shelf re-
gistration systems, both of which are based, in part, on presumptions about the effi-
ciency of the capital markets. On the integrated disclosure system, see Proposed
Comprehensive Revision to the System for Registration of Securities Offerings, Ex-
change Act Release No. 6235, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,649,
at 83,484 (Sept. 2, 1980); Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Unde-a'riter Due
Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1008 (1984); Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 157, at 550 & n.4. On shelf registration, see Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Effi-
cient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 136, 177-
80 (1984); Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 153, at 818-23.
159. See Coffee, supra note 145, at 753 ("the federal securities laws ain't necessarily
broke, so let's be careful about fixing them"). Easterbrook and Fischel's position is
more grudging. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 150, at 715 ("We cannot say that
the existing securities laws are beneficial, but we also are not confident that their prob-
able replacements would be better.").
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If a mandatory disclosure system is essential to the efficient op-
eration of the markets, the central question becomes one of defining
the type of system that will work best. This obviously raises serious
questions about the nature, timing, and form of disclosures under
the 1933 and 1934 Act, questions that must be answered if the effi-
ciency-based justifications for a mandatory disclosure system are to
be taken seriously. It also raises, however, serious questions about
whether multiple-state disclosure reviews, single-state "stickers"
and supplements, disclosures designed for the "average" investor,
and independently evolving state conceptions of materiality should
be part of an optimal mandatory disclosure system for public offer-
ings of securities.
To state the question in these terms is almost to answer it. The
structure of the question itself emphasizes the tendency toward du-
plication of efforts, inconsistency of standards, and parochial varia-
tions in the language and form of disclosure, all of which are the
virtually unavoidable consequences of a system built upon overlap-
ping jurisdictions and independent regulatory traditions. If one of
the major goals of disclosure regulation should be the production of
a collective fund of information that may be used (particularly by
securities intermediaries) to reduce the costs of searching for infor-
mation and to direct resources to more productive uses,' 60 would
the goal not be better achieved by imposing uniform disclosure re-
quirements, developing a single standard of materiality, and collect-
ing information in a single agency?
On closer examination, the answer is perhaps not self-evident.
Even if it is assumed that the most effective disclosure system is one
that collects and disseminates information through a single agency,
it cannot be assumed that the SEC has or will have the practical abil-
ity to perform that function.' 6 ' Administration of a mandatory dis-
closure system is labor-intensive, even in the truncated form that the
160. See generally Coffee, supra note 145, at 723-37.
161. For discussion of the SEC's recent difficulties in coping with its administrative
responsibilities, see Inundated Agency, Busy SEC Must Let Many Cases, Filings Go Uninvesti-
gated, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1985, at 1, col. 1. For a graphic description of the SEC's
declining regulatory resources in the context of booming securities markets, see
Morgenson, The Leaky Umbrella That Is the SEC, MONEY, Nov. 1985, at 226, 228.
The SEC's proposed fiscal 1988 budget, however, included a request for the largest
funding increase in fifty years. Much of the new funding is earmarked for a stepped-up
insider trading enforcement program, but substantial new resources would also be dedi-
cated to the Division of Corporate Finance. SEC Stepping Up Enforcement Efforts Seeks Big
Funding Increase for FY 1988, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 192-93 (Feb. 6, 1987). As of
this writing, the fate of this request is unknown.
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SEC currently administers.' 62 Some sharing of the regulatory re-
sponsibilities may be an effective means of accomplishing the task,
particularly with respect to smaller issues offered and traded in rela-
tively inefficient markets. Such sharing will, of course, generate the
problems described above, but those problems can perhaps bejusti-
fied as reasonable costs.
Furthermore, this is an area in which the states may be able to
play a useful role in regulatory innovation. The states' importance
as "little laboratories of democracy" (to use a hackneyed phrase)
has been vastly overstated, since state legislatures have often func-
tioned as soft targets for interest groups rather than as disinterested
arbiters of the public good,' 63 but the state securities regulators as a
group have often performed a useful innovative function. Their un-
derlying concern with fairness, for example, has made them particu-
larly sensitive to governance issues, leading them to require
particularly detailed disclosure with respect to affiliate transac-
tions, t" the participatory rights of limited partners,' 65 and, most re-
cently, shark repellents such as rights plans, poison pills, and blank-
162. The SEC does not thoroughly review every registration statement it receives.
For discussion of the different levels of SEC review, including "cursory" and "summary"
review, see R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
177-79 (5th ed. 1982). The adoption of the integrated disclosure system, furthermore,
significantly reduced the level of scrutiny to be applied to subsequent offerings by many
already public issuers. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure Systems, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 6383, [Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
72,328 (Mar. 3, 1982).
163. See Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 70 VA. L. REV. 813, 853 (1984):
When one examines the state "interests" at stake in the judicial choice be-
tween application of federal and state rules in the corporate and securities area,
the "interests" appear to be either those of particular interest groups whose
lobbying is more effective at one governmental level than another or the very
general interests of the states in preserving some bodies of substantive law that
are not substantially federalized.
There is an element of truth in Professor Anderson's argument, as is demonstrated by
the history of state takeover legislation. See Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Take-
over Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 18 (1976) (arguing that the
main advocates of state takeover legislation "are often present management concerned
more about their own jobs than about the state's economic welfare.") The attempt to
defend these statutes from Commerce Clause challenges has foundered on the difficulty
of articulating a legitimate state interest apart from that of special interest groups, but
Professor Anderson probably goes too far when she claims that "the traditional judicial
notion of federalism as involving some demarcation or balancing between discrete state
and federal interests that can be defined and evaluated appears false in the context of
corporate and securities law." Anderson, supra, at 853. For a detailed rebuttal, see
Kitch, A Federal Vision of the Securities Laws, 70 VA. L. REV. 857 (1984).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 106-111.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 97-105.
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check preferred stock. 16 6 The states have in particular taken the
lead in regulating public limited partnerships, their merit standards
serving as a basis for the development of industry standards. 167
An optimal mandatory disclosure system, therefore, may have
room for the state administrators. The SEC may not be able to
carry the burden alone, so perhaps it should share the regulatory
responsibilities with the states. The system may benefit, further-
more, from the regulatory innovations that the state administrators
seem able to provide. The current allocation of responsibilities for
disclosure regulation between the states and the SEC thus may not
be as counterproductive as it may seem. This observation does not
lead to the conclusion, however, that all is well with the current sys-
tem. The costs associated with the current allocation of responsibil-
ities could be reduced.
C. Suggestions for Reform
The task of finding ways to reduce the costs of integrating state
disclosure regulation into an optimal mandatory disclosure system
is complicated by the presence of merit regulation, to which state
disclosure regulation is inseparably bound in most jurisdictions.
The problem of allocating disclosure responsibilities is in fact a sub-
set of the larger problem of allocation of regulatory responsibilities
between the SEC and the states. No detailed solution to that prob-
lem can be proposed without detailed consideration of the goals,
functioning, and effects of merit regulatory systems, a task beyond
the scope of this article, 168 but at least one suggestion can be made
that applies equally to the disclosure and merit aspects of state se-
curities regulation.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 112-124.
167. See Makens, supra note 33, at 446 ("many of the standards developed by these
[real estate] guidelines have become industry standards applied by the promoters re-
gardless of the extent or kind of regulation to be applied to a particular offering");
Makens, A State Regulatory Perspective on the Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Dis-
closure to the SEC, 26 UCLA L. REV. 147, 151 (1978) ("The early tax shelter offerings
were so excessive in front-end promoter's compensation that they would have been an
embarrassment to Jesse James. It was merit regulation at the state level, not disclosure
or market factors, which ended the excesses .... "). The substantial influence of state
administrators on the development of new securities products is described in Edelman,
Publicly Traded Limited Partnership: An Emerging Financial Alternative to the Public Coiporation,
39 Bus. LAw. 709, 714 (J. Slater ed. 1984), in which counsel for some of the early pub-
licly traded limited partnerships explained that "we spent almost twelve months of inti-
mate waltzing with the securities commissioners of California and Texas each of whom
wanted to rewrite the several hundred page prospectus virtually from scratch."
168. For an attempt to address this problem, see Report on State Mlerit Regulation, supra
note 2, at 847-52.
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The goal of sharing regulatory responsibilities while minimiz-
ing the costs of sharing can be met by reducing, when possible, reg-
ulatory overlap and duplication of efforts. State law already
achieves this goal in a partial, inexact manner, by exempting offer-
ings by issuers listed on a national exchange and, in some states,
offerings by so-called "blue-chip" issuers or by issuers listed on the
NASDAQ/NMS. 169 These exemptions, in effect, constitute a divi-
sion of responsibilities between the states, which may not review of-
ferings by such issuers, and the SEC, which may. Much more
thought needs to be given to this approach, however, since there is
no consensus over its theoretical justification, as the current dispute
over the NASDAQ/NMS exemption demonstrates. 170 Instead of re-
lying on these state exemptions, most of which reflect either polit-
ical compromise' 7 1 or confused notions about "quality" or
"seasoned" issuers,' 72 policymakers should focus on differences in
markets and seek to identify those markets in which regulation
under the state securities laws would produce net benefits. Those
markets might include the particularly inefficient ones in which the
chances of market failure are high, restraints on the perverse incen-
tives of managers are low, and the expenditure of SEC resources is
not cost-effective. Examples of such markets might be those for lim-
ited partnership syndications, smaller corporate equity offerings
such as those filed on form S-18,'1" and, of course, intrastate offer-
ings. Different means of defining those offerings should be ex-
plored, either by reference to offering price, the firmly underwritten
character of the offering, or other characteristics.' 74 This approach
169. These exemptions are discussed in detail in Warren, Marketplace Exemption, supra
note 22, at 1511-23.
170. See NASAA Registration Exemption Committee, Report and Recommendations
Regarding State Registration Exemptions (Jan. 22, 1986), 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
206 (Feb. 7, 1986) (recommending major revision of exchange exemptions); D. Bell,
supra note 134, at 8-10 (criticizing both current exchange exemptions and proposed
NASDAQ/NMS exemptions); Commissioner's Letter, OHIO SEC. BULL., Oct. 1986, at 2-
3 (stating opposition to proposed Ohio NASDAQ/NMS exemption).
171. On the origins of the exchange exemption in a political compromise with the
Investment Bankers Association in the early years of the blue sky movement, see M.
PARRISH, snupra note 57, at 21-30.
172. For discussion of some of these notions, see Warren, Marketplace Exemption, snpra
note 22, at 1514-15.
173. SEC Form S-18, reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7301 (June 4, 1982).
Form S-18 is an abbreviated registration form available to offerings of $7.5 million or
less. Form S-18 may be filed in the SEC Regional Office for the region in which the
registrant's principal operations are or will be conducted. See SEC Form S-18, General
Instructions I, II.
174. Some states have already begun to experiment with such definitions by establish-
ing safe harbors from merit review for offerings that meet one or more of those criteria.
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would also lead, however, to a somewhat diminished overall role for
the states in the regulation of initial public offerings, and to a much
smaller role for the states in areas in which the SEC has a strong
presence, such as the regulation of investment company offerings.
The first step toward development of an optimal state-federal
mandatory disclosure system, therefore, is a market-oriented redefi-
nition of the role of state securities regulation in both its merit and
disclosure aspects. There is some indication that this rethinking of
the basic structural relationship between federal and state securities
regulation is beginning to take place. 175 The pace of such change,
however, is likely to be slow and incremental, so some attention
should be paid to the possibility of improvement within the con-
straints of the present system.
The key to improvement is improved coordination between the
SEC and the state administrators. This coordination could take
place at two levels. First, administrators in individual states and
SEC staff members should make a greater effort to communicate
with each other about their different disclosure concerns. This al-
ready happens to some extent in individual states, but it could hap-
See Sargent, Challenge, supra note 2, at 371-77 (analyzing Michigan safe-harbor rule for
certain firmly underwritten offerings); Report on State Merit Regulation, supra note 2, at
801-04 (analyzing similar exemptions in Washington and West Virginia).
175. See authorities cited supra note 174. See also Wisconsin Office of the Commis-
sioner of Securities & Marquette University College of Business Administration, Merit
Review: In the Public Interest? An Empirical and Qualitative Analysis of Merit Regula-
tion of Common Stock Offerings in Wisconsin (1986-87). The study described in this
report analyzed 1,439 initial public offerings made during the 1978-1984 period. Id. at
9. The report recommended on the basis of this study "that initial public offerings be
exempt from merit review if the issues are firmly underwritten and the issuer has com-
mon equity of at least $500,000." Id. at 4. In support of this recommendation, the
report asserted that "when sufficient supply and demand conditions are present, the
market will fairly price and evaluate the new issue. In such instances, government reg-
ulation is not necessary." Id. For a summary of the report, see Wisconsin Merit Review
Study Group Suggests Broader, Simplified Exemptions, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 65 (Jan. 9,
1987).
In Texas the State Securities Board has proposed a rule under which an offering
registered under the 1933 Act will be deemed fair, just, and equitable if it is firmly un-
derwritten, the public offering price is not less than $5 per share, and the aggregate
gross proceeds to the issuer are at least $2,000,000. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7,
§ 113.3(14) (proposed), reprinted in 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 55,583, at 49,521 (June
1987).
The Wisconsin and Texas administrators thus have demonstrated a willingness to
experiment with redefining the appropriate sphere for their regulatory efforts. The im-
mediate focus of these proposals, of course, is merit regulation, but they should be re-
garded in the broader perspective as experiments in the reallocation of regulatory
responsibilities, since the net effect of the proposed rules would be to assign to the SEC
primary responsibility for a broader class of offerings. This could have a substantial
impact on disclosure regulation in Texas and Wisconsin as well as on merit regulation.
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pen more frequently and more uniformly. Improved
communication could have the immediate, positive effect of reduc-
ing conflicting or inconsistent disclosure requirements, and could
have the long-term effect of creating common experience with dis-
closure regulation as well as a common fund of disclosure stan-
dards. Most importantly, it will help in the evolution of a common
conception of materiality, particularly if the development and appli-
cation of such a common conception is regarded as an appropriate
goal by both sides.
Second, greater coordination is needed at the institutional level
between the SEC and NASAA. This coordination could take several
forms. For example, it could include greater NASAA participation
in the SEC's formulation of disclosure policy. Such participation
could broaden the SEC's sensitivity to the states' disclosure con-
cerns, particularly those that emerge from their merit concerns. It
could also give NASAA and its members something of a
proprietorial interest in standards that it helped develop. SEC-
NASAA coordination also could take the form of joint examiner
training programs, in which both state and federal personnel could
be helped to develop a common vocabulary, a common understand-
ing of the goals and limitations of a mandatory disclosure system,
and an appreciation of the need for cooperative efforts. The prereq-
uisite to greater coordination between the SEC and NASAA,
though, should be the recognition of the need for such coordina-
tion.' 7 6 Section 19(c) of the 1933 Act 177 has already established a
176. There is some indication that the SEC and NASAA have begun to recognize the
need, in general, for greater cooperation. See SEC-NASAA Conference on Federal State
Securities Regulation 48-49, Summary Report (Apr. 1984) [hereinafter Summary
Report]:
To reduce tensions arising primarily from the subject of preemption, NASAA
and the SEC must work to improve their communications. Problems can be
avoided, duplicative regulation reduced, and time and money savings effected if
both groups will maintain a regular dialogue. NASAA and the SEC need to
study specifically targeted information, but also free and open information
sharing, including information on areas of economic impact, management and
administrative systems, training and statutory implementation.
177. Section 19(c) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1982), was enacted by Congress
in 1980 as part of the Small Business Investment Incentive Act, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94
Stat. 2275 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 775) (Oct. 21, 1980). Section 19(c) authorizes
the SEC to cooperate with NASAA in effectuating greater federal/state regulation by
promoting: (1) maximum effectiveness of regulation; (2) maximum uniformity in federal
and state regulatory standards; (3) minimum interference with capital formation; and
(4) substantial reduction in the costs of raising investment capital and the costs of gov-
ernment administration. To these ends, § 19(c) calls upon the SEC to meet regularly
with NASAA and others, with such conferences to provide a framework for cooperation
among all parties. See Summary Report, supra note 176, at 1-2 n.2.
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framework for the development of a more cooperative approach to
state-federal securities regulation; this framework needs merely to
be used as effectively in this area as it has been in others.
17
The possible implementation of these modest reform propos-
als, however, must not be regarded as a panacea. The more funda-
mental problem of defining and implementing a rational and
systematic allocation of regulatory responsibilities between the
states and the SEC remains unresolved, and until it is resolved, state
disclosure regulation will remain problematic.
178. The SEC and NASAA have already made some progress in developing a cooper-
ative approach to private and limited offering exemptions and to investment company
regulation. See Summary Report, supra note 176, at 5-8. For discussion of the need for
greater cooperation with respect to investment company regulation, see Sargent, State
Regulation of Investment Companies-Sources of the Current Controversy, 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 167
(1985).
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